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ABSTRACT 
Providing its goal is continued existence, every organization has a stake in the 
future. The very notion of sustainability is rooted in the desire to exist in the 
future, to endure shifts in values, behaviours, and needs of our society. The human 
brain is inherently predictive, but there are several human factors that prevent us 
from considering the future.  
 
Strategic foresight is an organization’s realization of their preferred future, and 
their capacity to imagine, invent, and align their business goals with this vision. 
But for many, institutional dynamics stimulate a myopia that makes imaging and 
realizing a preferred vision of the future a near impossible task. This work argues 
that the brain’s temporal wayfinding networks play a significant role in strategic 
myopia, and that there are several neurological interventions that organizations 
need to consider to nurture future-facing culture. It explores the relationship 
between strategic foresight and organizational culture and uses neuroscience to 
better understand the human factors of futuring. And using foresight maturity 
principles developed by Terry Grim and René Rohrbeck, it will outline key areas 
from which organizations can learn to build culture that gazes into the future.   
 
Key words: Organizational Culture, Neuroscience, Strategic Foresight, 
Leadership, NeuroLeadership, Organizational Psychology, Team-Building 
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1.0 PREAMBLE 
 
Mental time travel is one of the brain’s most complex, most tacit functions. Our 
predictive powers allow us to project images of ourselves in the future, using those 
images to inform decisions we make in the present. From the day we are born, the 
brain is gathering a cumulative capacity for futures thinking, and reflexively draws 
upon this repertoire of experiences to anticipate future needs. Those experiences 
nurture a temporal way-finding system that responds to environmental stimulus, 
mediating how we navigate our relationships, our jobs, and our connections to the 
world.  
 
We draw upon this way-finding system to help us navigate culture. When Darwin 
spoke of survival of the fittest, he underlined the most profound origin of the 
human spirit; the need to belong, to contribute value, and meaningfully fit into a 
social system. The brain’s neural networks are shaped by stimulus in its 
environment, and culture represents the cadence of that environment. Culture, 
thus, plays a strong role in how the brain navigates the world, and by proxy, how 
it navigates the future.  
 
The very notion of sustainability is rooted in the desire to exist in the future, to stay 
relevant and endure shifts in the environment. Strategic foresight provides 
organizations with intentional frameworks to imagine potential futures and act 
upon a preferred future. It empowers organizations to think about the future not 
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as an inevitable extrapolation of the present, but rather as a state we can carve out 
for ourselves. It offers organizations some agency over realizing their preferred 
future, offering tools to imagine, invent, and align their business goals with a 
vision of the world in the (not-too-distant) future. But for many, institutional 
dynamics stimulate a myopia that challenges its ability to imagine and realize a 
preferred vision of the future, suggesting a lack of cognitive resources for 
considering the long view.  
 
We are occupying a moment in history categorically defined by mass disruption 
across every sector. With that disruption comes uncertainty, to which the human 
brain does not respond particularly well. The brain is designed to keep us alive, to 
minimize threats to our survival and maximize comfort. It prefers routine and 
predictability over chaos and uncertainty. Drawing upon past experiences, the 
brain reflexively labels stimulus as either a threat or a reward within a fifth of 
second, leveraging the same neural networks used to process survival needs (Rock, 
2008). An organization is simply a group of people, a gathering of brains if you 
will, bound by a combination of personal and collective goals. The result is a 
complex cooperative system, complete with “physical, biological, personal and 
social components,” (Barnard, 1961) defined by a series of relationships that 
extend beyond the organization itself. This system is more colloquially referred to 
as organizational culture, which we unconsciously navigate via our individual 
wayfinding systems.  
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Strategic foresight not only provides a competitive advantage and builds more 
sustainable practices, but can also help us build more sophisticated temporal 
wayfinding for the human brain. As we build a more nuanced understanding of 
organizational culture that takes into account neurological responses, we can gain 
some understanding of some of the barriers that starve the brain of critical 
cognitive resources and ultimately limit the capacity to consider the long view. 
The hope is that we can help organizations create the optimal conditions for 
futures thinking across all levels of the company.  
 
This work begins with a thorough review of organizational culture literature, 
exploring the instruments for measuring culture put forth by the academic world 
with a critical eye.  It observes organizational culture through the lens of 
neuroscience, suggesting a few cognitive factors that influence our capacity for 
futures thinking. Armed with those factors, we then dive into the primary 
research component of the project, wherein ten foresight consultants identify the 
foresight maturity and several cultural dimensions of one of their respective 
clients, and that data is considered through a social neuroscience framework. The 
outputs of this exercise then give rise to several first principles of a future-facing 
organizational culture, which can act as points of intervention for organizations 
trying to cultivate long-view thinking. Finally, these principles are integrated into 
the Foresight Maturity Model (FMM), a tool that developed by Terry Grim 
			
	
	
4 
(Grim, 2009) that articulates the best practices of strong strategic foresight, and 
supports the journey of gazing into the futures.  
 
This work aims to challenge the ways in which we think about organizational 
culture, and reveal some of the human factors hindering futures thinking. It posits 
that to build more future-oriented strategic practices, we need to challenge the 
vestiges of organizational theory that remain highly mechanistic and ambiguous. 
And to do that, we must begin with an understanding of the human brain, 
drawing on evolutionary neuroscience, psychology, biology, and group 
dynamics.  After all, organizations are only human.  
 
At the intersection of organizational theory, strategic foresight, and neuroscience, 
this work asks the question how can neuroscience help us address the wickedness of 
organizational culture to empower future-facing decision making? 
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2.0 PHILOSOPHICAL UNDERPINNINGS 
 
The concept of time, and an enduring present, exists in every human society that 
we know of, whether in the form of prediction, rites of passage (a marked 
transition from youth to future social roles), migration, or simple calendars, 
“conceptions of time and future exist-and have existed- in human consciousness 
everywhere” (Bell, 1994). The study of futurism began with “the emergence of 
divination by mediums, oracles, or augurs,” that were used to learn about potential 
future occurrences (Barrett, 1996). Astrology, used to anticipate the destinies of 
individuals, groups, and nations through planetary movements and the 
positioning of the stars, is a more recent example of futuring that dates back to 
3300 BCE in Mesopotamia (ibid). Other ways of predicting the future over the 
course of history include “haruspication, bibliomancy, alectryomancy, cartomancy, 
clairvoyance, oneiromancy, ichthyomany, palmistry”, and others (Milojevic, 2002). 
 
Considerations of the future are “an integral aspect of the human condition,” 
because “by assuming a future, man makes his present endurable and his past 
meaningful” (McHale, 1969). One interpretation of the future is that it simply 
marks every moment after right now, as described by the American Industrial 
Arts Association; 
The future starts now, this moment, and extends forever. The 
future as viewed from today, any today, is made up of a multiplicity 
of possible alternative futures toward which we can move, with or 
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without control. The further ahead we project, the more 
alternatives exist (1974).  
 
Through this lens, one can argue that the future is everyone’s business, and 
particularly compelling is the idea of a preferred future; that is to say, the capacity 
to pick a future from a range of potential futures. Using scenarios that are carved 
out by critical uncertainties within an organization’s context, the goal is to 
empower organizations to work towards a future that is socially, technologically, 
economically, ecologically, politically, culturally, and ethically sustainable. 
Strategic foresight can be defined as "the ability to create and maintain a high-
quality, coherent and functional forward view, and to use the insights arising in 
useful organizational ways. For example to detect adverse conditions, guide policy, 
shape strategy, and to explore new markets, products and services. It represents a 
fusion of futures methods with those of strategic management"  (Slaughter, 1999).  
 
Driving the desire to carve out a preferred future is an urgency provoked by an 
accelerating culture. “Every human has the right and even a responsibility to 
respond to the future by intensifying his planning and elaborating his alternatives, 
even at the expense of the present. To believe that time, without planned change, 
will take care of our societal problems, is sheer nonsense” (DeVore & Lauda, 
1976). There is a profound tension from an organizational standpoint that 
DeVore & Lauda reveal here, and that is the following: even at the expense of the 
present. If we understand the present as being a moment catapulting us into a 
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future, then the present must instead be a representation of everything that 
happened leading up to now. Which reveals a challenge from a strategic foresight 
perspective - in order to prepare ourselves for a future, we must reconcile our 
knowledge of the past, and reason from a position of first principles.  
 
Strategic foresight in organizations helps us to mitigate some of the uncertainty in 
a world facing exponential change.  Using data from 77 large multinational 
companies, René Rohrbeck and Jan Oliver Schwarz, of Aarhus University and 
Germany’s EBS Business School, respectively, found that formal strategic 
foresight efforts add value through “(1) an enhanced capacity to perceive change, 
(2) an enhanced capacity to interpret and respond to change, (3) influence on 
other actors, and (4) an enhanced capacity for organizational learning” (Rohrbeck 
& Schwarz, 2013). These benefits all contribute to a corporate agility to best 
position organizations to drive innovation.   
 
Arguably, the single most significant barrier to considerations of the long view in 
organizational settings is the challenge of reconciling the present strategic goals 
with our preferred future. This is largely because “The pay of many C.E.O.s is 
tied to factors like short-term earnings, rather than to longer-term metrics, which 
naturally fosters myopia,” incentivizing leadership to focus on quarterly reports, 
instead of the long-view (Surowiecki, 2015). But in more abstract terms, there are 
certain cognitive barriers that prevent organizations from considering the long 
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view. Strategic foresight is regulated by human factors that ignite biases, challenge 
assumptions, and potentially disrupt convention. The Maslowian perspective 
provides insights into some of these factors: 
It seems quite clear that the need to know, if we are to understand 
it well, must be integrated with the fear of knowing, with anxiety, 
with needs for safety and security. We wind up with a dialectical 
back and forth relationship which is simultaneously a struggle 
between fear and courage. All those psychological and social factors 
that increase fear will cut our impulse to know; all factors that 
permit courage, freedom and boldness will thereby also free our 
need to know. (Maslow, 2013)  
 
This tension reflects a common barrier to innovation, described by Roger Martin 
in The Opposable Mind, “The ability to face constructively the tension of opposing 
ideas and, instead of choosing one at the expense of the other, generate a creative 
resolution of the tension in the form of a new idea that contains elements of the 
opposing ideas but is superior to each” (Martin, 2009). In the case of strategic 
foresight, past or present strategic goals are opposed to future ones, and balancing 
the tension of the past and the future is subject to a series of significant human 
factors. For business sustainability consultant Jim Collins, “Great companies 
foster a productive tension between continuity and change,” (Collins, 2009) where 
continuity represents strategic plans in the shorter term and where change represents 
working towards a preferred future. By definition, strategy is future-oriented; it is a 
process of mapping the organization’s future goals. But more often than not, 
strategy tends to be extrapolated from the past events and expectations, rather 
than being future-facing. Strategic foresight inherently deals with multiple time 
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horizons; the past, the near future, and the long view, all of which have strategic 
priorities, maintaining the tension between continuity and change. Organizations 
that work towards their preferred state not at the expense of more immediate time 
horizons provides a posteriori evidence of future-facing culture, and represents a 
crucial component of strategic foresight capacity-building.  
 
Some organizations are incredibly adept at balancing strategic time horizons. 
While the drivers of that capability are not immediately obvious, organizational 
culture can provide profound insights into how companies prioritize, incentivize, 
and manifest the long view in their strategic processes. Organizational culture is 
quite an enigma; rarely monolithic, riddled with sub-cultures and outliers, and in 
a constant state of flux, it is incredibly challenging to track its successes and 
failures (Watkins, 2013). An organizational culture is a tango of individual human 
factors, legacy structures, disproportionate incentivization bias and a range of 
other elements that make for a complex system.  
 
As a complex system, an organization’s culture has lots of moving parts, points of 
intervention, and reinforcing behaviour loops that make it tricky to influence. And 
many organizations present with cultural barriers that incentivize poorly, 
encourage dogma, and ultimately generate myopic strategic goals. The rather 
academically agreed-upon definition of organizational culture is  "a set of 
cognitions shared by members of a social unit" (O'Reilly, Chatman, & Caldwell, 
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1991), or more fully: "a system of shared values and beliefs that produces norms of 
behavior and establish an organizational way of life" (Koberg & Chusmir, 1987). 
These definitions are a bit mechanistic, and fail to capture the nuances of the 
complex system that is an organization’s culture. That is because an organization 
is made up of individuals, with their own values, beliefs, and norms, who are 
constantly reacting to stimulus whether implicitly or explicitly. And that creates 
an ecosystem with a kind of indeterminacy that prevents any one clear way of 
articulating and influencing an organization’s culture. 
 
In that way, organizational culture has all the makings of a wicked problem. First 
coined by Horst Rittel in the early 1960s, wicked problems are a “class of social 
system problems which are ill-formulated, where the information is confusing, 
where there are many clients and decision makers with conflicting values, and 
where the ramifications in the whole system are thoroughly confusing." 
(Churchman, 1967). The wickedness of organizational culture is born out not only 
out of its many individuals’ cognitive processes that impact one another, but also 
its shape-shifting nature, wherein both internal and external conditions are 
constantly and seemingly sporadically changing over time. 
 
As previously stated, the inquiry for this work began with the question; how can 
neuroscience help us address the wickedness of organizational culture to empower 
future-facing decision making?  
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An organization’s capacity to sustain and thrive throughout massive disruption 
still remains unexplored. This research is concerned with the relationship between 
an organization’s culture and the maturity of its strategic foresight. If 
organizations are simply a collection of people working towards a common goal, 
we need to better understand how the brain approaches considerations of the long 
view. The human brain has the capacity to shift over time, thus understanding the 
human factors behind culture reveals a critical intervention in stagnant, past-
oriented strategic practices.  
"Our brains are vastly different, in fine detail, from the brains of our 
ancestors...In each stage of cultural development...the average human had 
to learn complex new skills and abilities that all involve massive brain 
change...Each one of us can actually learn an incredibly elaborate set of 
ancestrally developed skills and abilities in our lifetimes, in a sense 
generating a re-creation of this history of cultural evolution via brain 
plasticity. It implies two-way traffic: the brain and genetics product 
culture, but culture also shapes the brain." (Doidge, 2007)  
 
In an era defined by uncertainty, understanding how to nurture the brain through 
change and work towards a preferred vision of the future will have an invaluable 
impact on our planet. If we can understand how the brain is impacted by 
organizational culture, especially in organizations with a particularly strong 
foresight practice, we can encourage these conditions in organizations who are 
struggling to navigate uncertainty. 
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3.0 ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE PRIMER 
 
Culture is not just produced by the brain; it is also by definition a series of activities 
(experiences) that shape the mind … we become “cultured” through training in 
activities, such as customs, arts, ways of interacting with people and the use of 
technologies and the learning of beliefs and shared philosophies and religion. 
 
ROBERT DOIDGE 
 
 
3.1 Etymology  	
Ideas of culture and belonging have appeared in literature that far predates 
modern social theory. Emerging from the latin root colere or cultura, early 
appearances of culture embodied the idea of tending or cultivating (Berger, 2000). 
This would later lend itself to the french verb culturer, or to cultivate. These early 
renditions saw the shift from culture as a verb inciting action, to a noun that 
implicates culture as a concept or object (ibid). The Oxford English dictionary 
articulates culture as "the cultivating or development... of the mind, faculties, 
manners, etc.... improvement or refinement by education and training... the 
training, development and refinement of the mind, tastes and manners" 
(Dictionary, 2004). This is a particularly important view of culture in the context 
of organizations because it implies that culture is not simply something an 
organization has, that remains fixed, but rather that culture is something that can 
evolve and shape-shift. Organizational culture can be crafted, and should be 
viewed as a process, rather than a static state.  
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Another important reference is the use of the word culture in the context of 
biology, as "the cultivation of bacteria, tissue cells, etc, in an artificial medium 
containing nutrients." It implies that the cells of an organism can proliferate 
readily in suitable conditions, and offers a rather cute analogy in our study of 
organizational culture; that when we provide people with a healthy ecosystem, 
they have a natural desire to collaborate to make great things happen.  
 
3.2 What the literature tells us 	
Identifying and examining organizational culture is an avidly researched area of 
management theory. Some 4,600 articles on the role of culture in organizational 
life are devoted to parsing a theory of organizational culture from which we can 
extract meaning and impact performance (Hartnell, et al., 2011).  Perhaps the 
most widely cited definition of organizational culture was penned by Edgar H. 
Schein as “a pattern of shared basic assumptions that was learned by a group as it 
solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, that has 
worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new 
members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those 
problems” (Schein, 2004). While this definition captures the spirit of 
organizational culture, it demonstrates many opportunities for subjectivity, 
misunderstanding, and misalignment. Its ambiguity reflects the challenge we have 
to interpret, identify, and parse culture; both qualitative and subjectivity-ridden, 
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the construct of culture remains one of the most elusive - and most valuable - 
components of an organization’s identity.  
 
It is widely accepted that organizational culture is an important component of a 
healthy organization, but there is no real consensus on a finite list of dimensions 
that are relevant to measuring organizational culture (Gordon & Di Tomaso, 
1992). Further, even if this list existed, part of the challenge in parsing 
organizational culture is the abstract nature of culture itself; more than just a 
cluster of shared values, organizational culture is complex living system with many 
moving parts.  
 
Much of the research exploring the relationship between organizational culture 
and performance reveals that shared norms that are well enforced among members 
of an organization promotes greater strategic alignment and attainment of core 
goals in strong-culture firms (Bezrukova, Thatcher, Jehn, & Spell, 2012; 
Rousseau, 1990; Tushman & O’Reilly, 2002.). But other sources tell quite a 
contradictory story: in 2002, Sorensen suggested that strong shared values only 
went so far in times of radical change: 
 
[...] Strong-culture firms gain advantages in stable environments 
but, because of the corresponding social control that promotes 
conformity among members, their financial performance may be 
worse or less reliable in dynamic environments and during periods 
of external change. Since many organizations operate in dynamic 
environments, this view suggests that having a strong culture in 
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these circumstances may reduce a firm’s financial performance. 
(Caldwell, et al, 2014) 
 
What this overt contradiction and subsequent equivocal support tells us, is that a 
comprehensive and compelling theory that links organizational culture and 
performance is lacking (Ibid, and Hartnell, et al., 2011). Equally lacking is an 
exploration of the relationship between organizational culture and strategic 
foresight. Strategic foresight is a tool in the design thinker’s toolkit that helps to 
organize our thinking about the future. It helps to contend with the uncertainty 
stimulated by dynamic conditions, consider a range of possible scenarios, and 
build strategy based on a preferred vision of the future. As Haridimos Tsoukas 
and Jill Shepherd note in Managing the Futures: Foresight in the knowledge economy, 
"The role of foresight is to provide business executives and government policy 
makers with ways of seeing the future with different eyes and fully understanding 
the possible implications of alternative technological / societal paths" (2009). 
Strategic foresight is not a sector, nor is it really a discipline in a traditional sense; 
rather it offers us ways of thinking about the future that best position us to act on 
it.  Strategic foresight as a way of thinking, must be considered on a cultural level, 
rather than simply as a business activity in which an organization participates.  
 
Hierarchical reductionism “consists not of replacing one field of knowledge with 
another but of connecting or unifying them” (Pinker, 2003). Introducing core 
concepts from the emerging field of neuroleadership to the conversation about 
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organizational culture can help us unify some of the thinking in both fields. 
Organizational neuroscience encourages thinking that deconstruct discrete brain 
processes in individuals (Ashkanasy, 2003; Barsade, Ramaraan, & Westen, 
2009;), broadening our understanding of what it means to be an individual in an 
organization.  
 
Much of the literature around organizational culture is based upon one of a 
handful of organizational cultural assessment tools. While not at all 
comprehensive, a review of four of these instruments provides some insight into 
how academia approaches the topic of organizational culture, and provide context 
for how social neuroscience principles can help organizations consider the future.   
 
Edgar Schein’s Model of Organizational Culture: Edgar Schein, former professor 
at the MIT Sloan School of Management built a theoretical framework for 
organizational culture that remains oft cited in the organizational development 
field. He identified three core layers of organizational culture: Artifacts, Espoused 
Beliefs & Values, and Underlying Assumptions (Schein, 2010): 
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Figure 1: Edgar Schein’s three layers of culture (Schein, 2010) 
 
 
At the very surface, says Schein, are the artifacts of an organization, including "the 
visible products of a group, such as the architecture of its physical environment; its 
language; its technology and products; its artistic creations; its style, as embodied 
in clothing, manners of address, emotional displays, and myths and stories told 
about the organization; its published lists of values; its observable rituals and 
ceremonies; and so on" (2006). Artifacts are manifestations of an organization’s 
culture, and not always immediately obvious. To infer too much about an 
organization’s artifacts is highly dangerous, as it often demands a great deal of 
subjectivity (ibid). 
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Espoused beliefs are those core pieces of an organization’s culture by which it 
lives. They are often clearly articulated, aspirational goals. They evoke a kind of 
modus operandi within an organization, setting the tone for behaviour without 
revealing much about the authentic nature of organizations. "Often such lists of 
beliefs and values are so abstract that they can be mutually contradictory, as when 
a company claims to be equally concerned about stockholders, employees, and 
customers, or when it claims both highest quality and lowest cost" (ibid). 
 
Underlying assumptions are the intangible, often subjective philosophy 
underpinning the organization. This is the oft taken-for-granted layer of 
organizational culture, representing the very foundation of the context in which 
lives. "Basic assumptions, in this sense, are [...] "theories in use" -the implicit 
assumptions that actually guide behaviour, that tell group members how to 
perceive, think about and feel about things" (ibid; Argyris and Schon, 1974).  
 
Schein’s work presents a fairly unsophisticated view of culture, and does not 
capture the complex, systems-nature of culture that is rife with nuances and 
shape-shifts with market conditions and attitudes. It does, however, present a 
strong theoretical foundation out of which much of academic thinking was born, 
and developed much of the language that the academic community, making the 
topic more accessible to business thinkers on a significant scale.  
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The Organizational Culture Assessment Instrument (OCAI): This tool employs 
a set of scenarios to establish fundamental aspects of an organization’s culture. 
Participants are invited to rate their organization’s resemblance to the described 
scenarios by dividing 100 points across four scenarios as they see fit, each one 
reflecting a particular quadrant in the competing values framework. The OCAI 
considers the following dimensions: (1) the dominant characteristics of the 
organization; (2) the leadership style that permeates the organization; (3) the 
organizational glue or bonding mechanisms that hold the organization together; 
(4) the strategic emphases that define what areas of emphasis drive the 
organization’s strategy; (5) the criteria of success that determine how victory is 
defined and what gets rewarded and celebrated; and (6) the management of 
employees or the style that characterizes how employees are treated and describes 
the working environment (Cameron, 2004). These dimensions reflect the core 
cultural values and assumptions that exist within the organization and represent 
“how things are.” Though not comprehensive, these dimensions are seen by the 
organizational psychology community as providing “an adequate picture of the 
type of culture that exists in an organization” (Cameron and Quinn, 1999). “By 
having organization members respond to questions about these dimensions, the 
underlying organizational culture can be uncovered” (Cameron, 2004). The 
OCAI is conducted by members of the organization, who may be particular 
sensitive to the nuances of the organization’s culture. These are participants, who 
			
	
	
20 
may be engaged in implementing large-scale change initiatives, and whose 
strategic position in the organization requires that these changes be run past them 
before being initiated (Cameron 2004). After participants’ individual scores are 
calculated, a group discussion to achieve some consensus of the organizational 
culture is conducted, with ongoing input regarding the way in which consensus is 
achieved among the group. 
Considering the potentially disparate perspectives of individual 
raters is a rich and enlightening part of culture assessment since it 
uncovers multiple perspectives that may go unnoticed otherwise. 
This discussion builds understanding, opens lines of 
communication, and reveals elements of the organization’s culture 
that a single individual or task force may miss. (Cameron, 2004) 
 
Following this conversation, the OCAI is then conducted a second time, with the 
same group of participants. This time, participants are asked to consider a 
preferred vision of the organizational culture. Based on a time horizon of their 
choosing, participants uncover a preferred future culture, answering specific 
questions around what change they would like to see and how their preferred 
culture will allow them long-term success. This aspirational assessment is first 
established individually, and followed up with another consensus-building group 
discussion. 
 
This emphasis on a preferred future could make this model a natural integration 
with the FMM. Because the FMM takes a snapshot of where an organization sits 
and then carves a potential pathway to achieving higher levels of maturity, the 
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OCAI could provide a useful visioning exercise for a preferred organizational 
culture. Having said that, the particular items used to measure culture reveal little 
about the state of foresight practices. Considerable changes would have to be 
made to the OCAI to provide data on the particular activities as they relate to 
ongoing horizon scanning, external climate analysis, resilience, and strategic 
planning. 
 
The categorization of the OCAI outcomes is also quite polarizing. The 
competing values framework is mapped across a matrix whose polarities cannot 
each be 100 percent at the same time. As such, they are competing in nature. The 
polarities are Internal focus and integration or External focus and differentiation, 
and Stability and control or Flexibility and discretion (Bremer and Lamers, 2016). 
 
 	
 
Figure 2: The Competing Values Framework, used in the OCAI (Bremer and Lamers, 2016) 
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The left side of the graph represents an internally-focused organization 
preoccupied with what is important to the members of the organization and how 
they want to work, whilst the right side of the graph represents an outward lens, 
focused on the state of the world, the market, and clients. The northern portion of 
the graph represents a desire for flexibility and discretion, whereas its southern 
counterpart values stability, order, and control.  
 
Each cultural type represents a kind of trope that has emerged in the 
organizational culture space and fails to capture the nuances of the culture in 
which the individuals identify. Whilst the focus on a preferred vision of culture 
could be useful in the context of a maturity model, the OCAI and subsequently, 
the competing values framework, does not offer any reference of a time horizon in 
its valuation.  
 
Schneider’s Culture Model: Schneider’s colloquial definition of organization 
culture is “How we do things around here to succeed,” and uses two axes to plot 
the orientation of the organization. The x-axis, People Oriented to Company 
Oriented, articulates the spectrum from personal to impersonal, wherein the 
former is more focused on elevating the individual strengths, goals and 
relationships of its members and the latter is more focused on creating a well-
oiled machine wherein each group member fulfills a specific purpose. The Y-axis 
is defined by Possibility and Reality, wherein the latter makes way for iteration, 
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ambiguity and exploration, whereas the former focuses on actualities and tried-
and-true fact. 
 
Schneider’s model is deeply rooted in behavioral psychology, leveraging Edgar 
Schein’s philosophy, wherein organizational goals “emerge initially from the kind 
of person or persons, who establish (found) the organization,” (1985). Schein goes 
on to say: 
As an organization confronts both its larger environment and its 
internal environment, the processes and structures that are 
appropriate for survival will emerge and evolve. The processes and 
structures that emerge in a bank will differ from those in a YMCA 
- the environments they confront will be different because the 
people who formed them were different. (Ibid) 
 
Schneider positions both individuals and sector as incredibly formative in an 
organization’s culture, wherein the kind of work an organization produces is 
representative of the kind of culture that emerges. Arguably, the way these 
organizations approach risk, the length of the decision-making cycle, and the 
financial structure of the organization may all be factors of what Schneider 
describes in his culture model. Below, the Schneider culture matrix is visualized 
with in situ considerations throughout.  
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Figure 3: Schneider’s culture matrix interpreted to reflect behavioural nuances (Sahota, 2011)  
 
Where this model is most compatible with the study of foresight is in its use of 
Possibility – Reality orientation. Related to how those within an organization 
experience time, this axis has the potential to expose attitudes around future 
scenarios, horizon scanning, systems thinking, and sensitivity to possibilities that 
extend beyond traditional strategic planning cycles. Schneider’s model tells us 
more about the people in an organization than about the specific practices and 
processes. It might reveal insight around questions like “What do people value in 
organizations who practice foresight,” and “What kind of people are more likely 
to integrate futures thinking into their business.” But it does little to investigate 
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the best practices of organizational culture, and is least likely to address the 
hypothesis in question. 
 
Like the OCAI, Schneider’s model is highly ideological, inadvertently driving bias 
and encouraging participants to align themselves with highly dogmatic, polarized 
values. It encourages an almost partisan approach, wherein most organizations 
would likely self-identify with the quadrant they feel emotionally committed to, 
yet likely embody qualities from all four quadrants. 
 
The Organizational Culture Profile (OCP): This model is based on the Q-sort 
method and provides a quantitative assessment of organizational culture. Using 54 
norm statements (e.g., fast-moving, being precise) emerging from academic- and 
practitioner-oriented writings on culture, participants are asked to sort the 
statements that are designed to act as wide-ranging and inclusive descriptors 
(Chatman, 1989; 1991) of organizational culture. The OCP has been used 
extensively in organizational research (Sarros, Gray, Densten, & Cooper, 2005), 
using consensus and intensity to measure the strength of values present within 
culture. The Q-sort method requires participants to limit their categorization of 
norms in the Strongly Disagree and Strongly Agree columns in a way that prompts 
them to reflect and be highly selective.  
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Figure 4: Example of a Q-sort framework, used by OCP participants to rank cultural dimensions.  
 
 
Norms are marked expressions of a group’s core values and beliefs, and positions 
how members interact with one another and prioritize activities and objectives 
(Bettenhausen & Murninghan, 1991; Feldman, 1984). Culture has been defined 
as a pattern of shared assumptions, beliefs, and expectations that guide members’ 
interpretations and actions by defining appropriate behavior within an 
organization (Fiol, 1991; Schein, 1985). Emerging from an organization’s values, 
norms are socially-created standards which help members interpret and evaluate 
events and set expectations for organizational performance and behaviours 
(O’Reilly & Chatman, 1996, Chatman, Caldwell, O'Reilly and Doerr, 
2014).  Norms can help members to solicit and appropriate the information and 
behaviors that are likely valued or useful within the context of their organization 
(Ashford & Northcraft, 1992). 
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In stable market conditions, shared norms throughout organizations that are 
strongly enforced across all levels of management encourage growth, helps 
organizations to attain their goals and promotes strategic alignment (Bezrukova, 
Thatcher, Jehn, & Spell, 2012; Rousseau, 1990; Tushman & O’Reilly, 2002). 
However, in more volatile, uncertain market conditions, a strong organizational 
culture promotes a kind of social control that enforces conformity, which may not 
be ideal in dynamic environments and during periods of intense external change 
(Sørensen, 2002). Having a strong culture, in these environments may not present 
any real advantage. The OCP allows researchers to avoid conformity by 
distinguishing “between conformity to a norm and uniform behavior emerging 
from such conformity,” (Chatman, Caldwell, O'Reilly and Doerr, 2014) emerging 
with a more nuanced understanding of how members of a culture relate to norms. 
The OCP evaluation reveals: (1) culture consensus, which we define as the degree 
to which members agree about a broad set of cultural norms, (2) norm intensity, 
which we define as the force with which a specific norm is held, and (3) norm 
content, which we define as the actual substance of particular norms which give 
rise to the attitudes and behaviors defining that content (ibid).  
 
While this instrument is the most complex and calculating of all instruments, the 
researchers made faced challenges that are emblematic of organizational culture 
assessment. It is highly mechanistic, and fails to capture the human factors at play 
in organizational culture.  
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3.3 Paradox of the Cultures 	
Assessing culture demands observation by the organization's insiders. Culture 
requires membership. It demands to be articulated by those within, that is to say, 
identification with culture validates its presence. The very nature of culture is that 
it only exists if the members of that culture relate to it. Thus you must be a 
member of a culture, or subject to that culture’s values, to identify them.  
 
But paradoxically, the insiders of a culture are often too close, too subjective, to 
accurately identify their cultural values. And thus, they are incapable of providing 
an objective assessment of an organization’s culture. What emerges is a gap 
between what they believe or prefer to be true about their culture, and what their 
culture is really like. This gap between who an organization thinks it is, and what 
it truly is, leaves it especially vulnerable in times of uncertainty.  
 
What makes for a strong organizational culture? In stable conditions, 
organizations with homogenous cultures may have an advantage, but that is not 
enough to ensure an organization can endure in times of uncertainty. This is 
“because of the corresponding social control that promotes conformity among 
members,” these advantages are often less reliable in “dynamic environments and 
during periods of external change” (Sorensen, 2002). Thus, in times of increased 
ambiguity, exponential advancements in technology, and massive changes in 
human behaviour, breeding an adaptive culture that thrives in ambiguity is crucial.  
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Connections have been made in the organizational culture research around 
adaptability and financial performance. A recent study in the United States 
revealed that “Firms with higher levels of consensus across many norms, as well as 
an intensive emphasis on adaptability that may promote conformity without the 
inertial effects of uniformity, performed better financially over a volatile three-year 
period.” (Chatman et. al, 2014) This suggests that a shared understanding of an 
organization’s culture is important, but that organizations should not encourage 
sameness. Organizations often confuse harmony with conformity; a 2003 survey 
revealed “82% of people who make hiring decisions felt culture fit was important 
in the hiring process; 59% had rejected candidates who didn’t fit in” (Aarts, 
2015).  For organizations who lack a nuanced understanding of organizational 
culture, it is tempting to hire people who superficially reflect the organization, 
especially in a period of growth where everything seems to be going well. But 
conversely, organizations struggling in the face of disruption will often hire 
against the grain, in the hopes that the ‘fresh perspective’’ can turn things around. 
Both Sorensen and Chatman et. al suggest that conformity and uniformity work 
against organizations in times of great change.  
 
By analogy, this is a common phenomenon in natural systems. Crops with low 
levels of biodiversity tend to be more likely to be completely wiped out when there 
is a change in conditions. This is because crops in a monoculture share genetic 
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traits, making them more susceptible to disease to which they have little to no 
resistance (Shiva, 1993). Conversely, biodiversity allows for more potential 
solutions for future scenarios, because plentiful plant DNA translates to more 
information about survival when environmental circumstances change. Likewise 
in strategic foresight, scanning the periphery and engaging a broad network are 
important facets of a healthy foresight culture.  Diversity in futures thinking 
promotes the propagation of multiple views of the future, many of which are 
plausible, and better prepares its members for all the possibilities. A strong 
foresight practice is one wherein members cultivate rich future worlds, where the 
future is not simply an extrapolation of the present. Instead, foresight acts as a 
heuristic strategic thinking tool, offering a safe space to test concepts of the future, 
cultivating rich, sensory narratives of what could be. In experimenting with a 
diverse set of potential futures, we build new mental models that help in “reducing 
the likelihood and magnitude of surprise,” (Hines & Bishop, 2006) and build a 
kind of cognitive agility that reduces the discomfort of uncertainty.  
 
We know that some degree of heterogeneity is a crucial component of a future-
facing organizational culture, and we know that organizations who identify with 
adaptability tend to perform better in changing conditions. What we do not yet 
know, is how the brain adapts to change and the neurological impact of 
uncertainty. 
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3.4 The Neuroscience of Organizational Culture 	
Straddling human psychology, sociology, anthropology, behavioural science, and 
organizational theory, the topic of organizational culture has become a topic of 
fascination for countless scholars for over fifty years. It has only been in the last 
decade or so that management scholars began to explore the relationship between 
human biology and workplace behaviours and attitudes. The empirical evidence is 
scarce, but it generally spans across three areas of study: evolutionary psychology, 
behavioural genetics, and physiological conditions (Becker et. al., 2011). 
Evolutionary theories descend from the ancestral development of Homo Sapiens. 
As Nicholson (2000) and Price (2006) explain, examining natural selection allows 
us to better understand leadership and reputation in work teams. For example, to 
deal with “free riders,” humans evolved to develop a set of cognitive tools that help 
us detect cheating (Becker et. al., 2011; and Tooby, Cosmides, & Price, 2006). 
Scientists have also studied a series of genetic influences that impact individuals in 
their work environments. Some research reflects upon the relationship between 
genes and leadership qualities (Ilies, Gerhart & Le, 2004), while others focused 
on how genes relate to entrepreneurship (Shane, Nicolaou, Cherkas, & Spector, 
2010). Some research found evidence that some individuals are more genetically 
predisposed to stable attitudes or dispositions (Arvey, Bouchard, & Ilies, 2006), 
and that some genetic traits impact workplace values and job satisfaction (Arvey, 
Bouchard, Cavanaugh, McCall, & Taubman, 1994).  
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Physiological responses to stress at work have also been a point of interest for 
some scholars. Becker et. al. provide an excellent summary of the research 
conducted in this space: 
[For example,] Wright, Cropanzano, Bonnett, and Diamond 
(2009) found that workers who had higher well-being tended to 
have lower pulse pressure than did their lower well-being 
counterparts. Perrewé and colleagues (2004) concluded that 
political skill could help workers maintain good cardiovascular 
health even when their environment was characterized by role 
conflict. Similarly, Wagner, Feldman, and Hussy (2003) found 
that employees had higher blood pressure when they worked with a 
troublesome supervisor and lower blood pressure when they 
worked with a more supportive supervisor. (2011) 
 
These three areas of study; evolutionary psychology, behavioural genetics and 
physiological responses to our environment, all reinforce one another. Darwinian 
evolution shaped our behaviours (Ilies et. al., 2006), natural selection gave rise to 
the human genome, and genes express themselves differently in human beings 
through our individual physiology on a daily basis (Becker et. al., 2011). Social 
neuroscience aims to identify how group dynamics form from individual 
physiology, and identify patterns that can be used to help us understand 
organizational culture. As Canadian neuroscientist Merlin Donald argued, 
“culture changes our functional cognitive architecture, meaning that, as with 
learning to read and write, mental functions are reorganized” (Donald, 1991). 
Significant cultural change actually impacts the architecture of the brain, and we 
“find familiar types of stimulation pleasurable; we seek out like-minded 
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individuals to associate with, and research shows we tend to ignore or forget, or 
attempt to discredit, information that does not match our beliefs, or perception of 
the world, because it is very distressing and difficult to think and perceive in 
unfamiliar ways” (Doidge, 2007). Exponential change in the market can be 
exceedingly challenging for organizations because on an individual level, the lack 
of familiarity with images of the future neurologically presents as a threat.  It also 
means that understanding the neuroscience behind future-facing organizational 
culture has the capacity to extend far beyond the workplace. “Learned cultural 
beliefs and behaviours are not simply learned cognitive constructs. Rather, they 
are deeper changes in brain structure and neuronal interconnectedness, and 
therefore much more difficult to change” (Weitz, 2015). It may be more difficult 
to shift deep structures of the brain to consider the long view, but if successful, 
could stimulate societal ripples that extend far beyond the individual and their 
organization. 
 
The gap between what an organization believes its culture to be and its authentic 
culture is an important piece of the cultural puzzle. This gap represents an 
organization’s aspirational appraisal of itself, and how those aspirations play out 
across its members in reality can reveal a lot about the barriers in shifting 
organizational mindset. This is where neuroscience can help, by exploring how 
the brain responds to certain environmental stimuli.  This gap is challenging to 
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examine, largely because it demands a focus on implicit attitudes within an 
organization, rather than simply explicit ones.  
 
First coined by psychologists Thomas Suddendorf and Michael C. Corballis, 
mental time travel is the human capacity to “mentally project themselves backward 
in time to relive, or forward to prelive, events” (1997). We spend an 
overwhelming amount of our cognitive capacity considering the future, through 
tasks like planning and problem-solving. In fact, according to several studies, 
envisioning and anticipating future scenarios takes up a whopping one third of 
spontaneous cognition (Andrews-Hanna et.al., 2010; Atance & O'Neill, 2001; 
Peters & Büchel, 2010; Sheldon et. al., 2001; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007).  
 
The neural networks that are responsible for imagining future outcomes are the 
same ones activated when we recall past experiences (see Figure 5, on the 
following page). In 2007, researchers revealed that we draw on details from the 
past and reconfigure them “into a novel future event,” yielding a vision of the 
future that “is plausible given one’s intentions for the future” (Addis & Schacter, 
2008). This tells us that we essentially remember the future; that imagining events 
in the future happens via the same neural networks as remembering the past 
(Addis et. al., 2007).  
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Figure 5: Brain activation, when remembering past events and imagining future events. (Addis et. al., 
2009; Schacter et. al., 2012) 
 
 
Psychologist Thomas Suddendorf, aptly refers to this phenomenon as the ‘The 
Janus Hypothesis.’ Janus is a roman god with two faces on his head that gaze in 
opposite directions, one of which is said to be staring into the past, and the other 
into the future. “The human brain, like Janus, seems to recycle at least some 
aspects of its temporal perspective on events and facts, whether what it is ‘looking 
at’ is ‘behind’ it or ‘ahead’ of it in time” (La Fontaine, 2014), utilizing similar 
networks of brain for either activity. Suddendorf and Corballis outline two types 
of memory in their mental time travel paradigm; declarative, and non-declarative 
(2007).  
 
Declarative memory is that which can be clearly identified. Information stored in 
declarative memory gives rise to explicit attitudes, which are manifestations that 
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can be voluntarily and consciously accessed and are “at least partly verbalizable 
(Tulving, 2005). Declarative memory can be further broken down into two 
categories; semantic memory, and episodic memory (Suddendorf & Corballis, 
2007). Our semantic memory stores information about the world that endures, 
general knowledge that can be consciously leveraged to help understand the 
future, what Suddendorf & Corballis refer to as “semantic prospection” (ibid). 
Information stored in our semantic memory is agnostic in that it happens 
separately from the experience of learning it. Episodic memory, on the other hand, 
is highly experiential, personal, and specific. When we recall episodic memories, 
we gain “access to the personally experienced event, rather than just the 
knowledge extracted from the event” (ibid). See Figure 6 on the following page.  
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Figure 6: The past to future spectrum, informed by episodic, semantic and procedural memory 
(Suddendorf and Corballis, 2007).  
 
 
On the flip side, non-declarative memory is procedural (ibid), forming our implicit 
attitudes about the world (Becker et., al., 2011). These are below the surface, 
instincts we have developed through ongoing conditioning from our environment. 
These are challenging to identify, as they cannot always be identified or 
articulated, but can trigger intense reactions in the brain. Implicit attitudes are 
highly emblematic of organizational culture. Implicit attitudes are responsible for 
our gut feelings. They draw upon experiences and past outcomes in our long-term 
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memory to develop instincts about the world.  Implicit attitudes are provoked 
when individuals are presented with stimulus and reflexively engage with that 
stimulus, forming the je-ne-sais-quoi that organizations often struggle to 
articulate. In aggregate, the implicit attitudes of individuals of an organization set 
the tone, and represent the somewhat ethereal facets of an organization’s culture 
that are tough for even insiders to identify. The implicit attitudes of an 
organization’s members are incredibly powerful catalysts within an organization’s 
ecosystem, and generate the coveted dynamics that organizational culture theorists 
are continuously seeking to define.  
 
Current organizational culture assessments and approaches all share one very 
important thing in common; they all seem to focus largely on these explicit 
attitudes in the workplace. This is information stored in the declarative memory 
that Suddendorf and Corballis (2007) outline in their taxonomy of memory in 
Figure 6 (page 37).  Most organizational culture research measure explicit attitudes 
because they are more deliberate. We can form patterns and build more concrete 
cultural models from these features because they are identifiable and we are 
usually more “aware of the considerations and comparisons that went into 
formulating our explicit opinion.” (Becker et al., 2011).  Explicit attitudes are 
more malleable over time, and are processed in newer structures of the frontal 
lobe.  
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Implicit attitudes are considerably tougher to measure (see Figure 7, for Important 
Differences Between Implicit and Explicit Attitudes). These are reflexive attitudes 
(rather than reflective), automatic reactions that happen in the brain, that are often 
so subconscious we are not even aware of them. These are the non-declarative, 
stimulus-driven responses stored in procedural memory, identified by Suddendorf 
and Corballis (2007). The following chart from Becker et. al breaks down the 
differences in how explicit and implicit attitudes manifest: 
 
 
Figure 7: Important Differences Between Implicit and Explicit Attitudes (Suddendorf and Corballis, 
2007) 
 
Implicit attitudes are “produced in phylogenetically older regions [of the brain],” 
(Becker et al., 2011) and as such, are much more resistant to change. They are 
very much informed by past experiences, and are “essentially primed by the 
current environment,” without “consideration of future consequences.” (ibid) 
Further, “Brainstem – Limbic networks process threat and reward cues within a 
fifth of a second, providing you with ongoing non-conscious intuition of what is 
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meaningful to you in every situation of your daily life,” (Gordon et al., 2008), 
making it tough to identify implicit attitudes and craft meaningful interventions. 
Often our non-conscious (read: implicit) bias is confused with unintentional, self-
justifying rationalizations (Haidt, 2006; Westen, 2007). To make matters more 
complicated, strong implicit attitudes may “impede the processing of 
contradictory information,” (Westen et. al., 2006; Becker et. al., 2011) which 
points to the challenge of maintaining multiple time horizons when articulating 
an organization’s strategic goals. 
 
Why is this important to the conversation around organizational culture and 
strategic foresight? Because one of the most significant aspects of a future-facing 
culture is that it can shapeshift and be amenable to change initiatives. And it has 
been suggested in the organizational neuroscience field that one of the major 
reasons change initiatives fail, is because management is focused on the 
organization’s explicit attitudes and neglect to target implicit ones. “As a result, 
organizational researchers and managers who do not consider the influence of 
implicit attitudes will tend to overestimate the ease with which individuals can 
adapt to change” (Becker et al., 2011; T. D. Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000).  
 
Social neuroscience can help us build a general understanding of how the brain 
responds to social stimuli, nodding to the implicit attitudes that inform explicit 
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attitudes, and providing important benchmarks that we can use to understand 
organizational dynamics. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
			
	
	
42 
4.0     HOW NEUROLOGICAL CONDITIONS MANIFEST IN 
ORGANIZATIONS 	
Change almost never fails because it's too early. It almost always fails because it's too 
late.  
 
SETH GODIN  
 
 
4.1 The Icarus Paradox 	
We are in an epoch of massive, ubiquitous, exponential change. It is an incredible 
moment in civilization where we are sitting at the very edge of what we know and 
the opportunities for better futures are ripe for the picking. With that, comes a 
great deal of uncertainty, which strategic foresight helps organizations to navigate 
and make intentional efforts to work towards its preferred vision of the future. But 
as we have seen in previous chapters, there are several neurological processes that 
temper the way we calculate uncertainty.  
 
One of the most significant human factors impeding considerations of the long 
view is a syndrome often referred to as the Icarus Paradox.  
Icarus was a figure in Greek mythology who fashioned some wings 
out of feathers and beeswax to escape an island. So enamored of his 
newfound ability to fly, Icarus ignored warnings not to fly too close 
to the sun. Upon getting close to the sun, the beeswax melted, his 
wings fell off, and he plummeted to his death. This tale forms the 
Icarus Paradox: The same thing that had made Icarus successful is 
what led to his downfall. In his overconfidence he had become 
blind to the dangers of flying too close to the sun. (Vermeulen, 
2009) 
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The tale of Icarus represents an important lesson that many organizations fail to 
learn; that an organization’s greatest asset can become its greatest downfall if it 
fails to grasp the context of the bigger picture. What results is a kind of myopia, 
occupying what Manfred F.R. (2001) refers to as a “splendid isolation,” wherein 
they are protected from ambiguity from the outside world (Palma, P., & da Costa, 
N.G., 2006). These mental barriers limit the strategic capacity of leaders to take 
in larger scale, ‘sticky’ problems and examine the long view within the context of 
their organization. It represents a significant barrier to considerations of the long 
view,  wherein “managers tend to ignore or postpone problems that require 
reflection, systematic planning, or creative thinking, and for which there is no 
external pressure for immediate action.” (Palma, P., & da Costa, N. G., 2006).  
 
This challenge extends to the assessment of organizational culture itself. Members 
in a culture are often too close, too embedded, to give a good read on it, but one 
must be close in order to fully grasp the nuances of organizational culture. 
Membership in a culture demands identification with cultural tenants, and 
identifying with the culture is validating and proof that it exists. The result is the 
need for a kind of subjective objectivity, wherein members must be embedded 
enough to observe the cultural dimensions of the organization, yet remain 
neurologically unburdened by the dynamics.  
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To understand the way that the human brain processes its environment, we turn 
to the limbic system, specifically the amygdala. This small, almond-shape object is 
core “remembering whether something should be approached or avoided” (Rock, 
2008). What is really interesting about the amygdala and its associated networks is 
that they activate proportionately to the intensity of the emotional response. This 
processing is often subconscious; one study revealed that the amygdala categorized 
nonsense words that merely mimicked threatening ones in very same way that it 
categorized threatening words (Naccache et al, 2005). This is often why 
organizations opt to bring in external consultants to deal with profound strategic 
questions, and why consultants were chosen to be participants in this research. In 
theory, a consultant is less encumbered by the hierarchical power dynamics and 
does not need to navigate organizational culture quite as diligently as other 
members of the culture. Simply stated, the stakes are lower; they are not as close 
to the organization, and thus, less emotionally impacted by its culture.  
 
Systemic, future-oriented, macroscopic approaches tend to be less prioritized by 
managers.  “Time horizons have become shorter and instead of considering long-
term horizons (4-5 years), organizations try to develop a more appreciative 
understanding of their current environment and its likely evolution” (M.P. Cunha 
et al, 2006). Economic pressures to understand the perspectives currently plaguing 
the organization mean that managers often turn to superficial metrics (social 
media imprints, for example). These metrics could actually represent weak signals 
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in the landscape, but reactive environments demand a high level of resources. 
“Because the validity of knowledge contained in plans becomes rapidly obsolete, 
even before the plan is implemented, organizations may prefer to give priority to 
the realities of the present rather than to the prediction of the future[s]” (M.P. 
Cunha et al, 2006). 
 
4.2 Neuroplasticity - The brain’s propensity to change (to a point) 
 
Evolutionary psychologists argue that human beings all share certain core 
departments in the brain, and that our experiences shape these modules to 
account for differences in language, perspectives, mating, etc. (Doidge, 2007). 
These modules evolved from the Pleistocene age, roughly 1.8 million to ten 
thousand years ago, and have remained genetically unchanged (ibid). 
Neuroplasticity reveals that though these brain structures descend from the same 
genes, our brains shift in changing conditions. The brain has the capacity to 
change structurally and functionally, stimulated by both environment and personal 
experience (Shaw & McEachern 2001). From the moment we are conceived, our 
brains are undergoing a series of developmental activities with the intent on 
preparing us for the future. The human brain is "constructed for change. It's all 
about change. It confers on us the ability to do stuff tomorrow that we can't do 
today, things today that we couldn’t do yesterday” (Merzenich, 2004).  
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Neuroplasticity is “an intrinsic property of the human brain and represents 
evolution's invention to enable the nervous system to escape the restrictions of its 
own genome and thus adapt to environmental pressures, physiologic changes, and 
experiences” (Pascual-Leone, et.al, 2005). In some ways, the human brain is 
designed to evolve for a changing future, adapting to new circumstances and 
responding to experiences that we expose it to on a repetitive basis. There is 
evidence, for example, that meditation has the capacity to increase gray matter 
and improve overall cognitive function in at least eight different regions of the 
brain (Fox et. al, 2014). Buried in the limbic system, the hippocampus was one 
such area that showed an increase in gray matter in participants who participated 
in an eight-week mindfulness program (Congleton, Holzel, and Lazar, 2015).    
 
However, the brain’s plasticity is a double-edged sword. As much as we can 
positively influence our brains and even build grey matter over time, we also adapt 
our brains to cultural patterns that are unhealthy, and often, not future-facing. 
“The plastic paradox teaches that neuroplasticity can also be responsible for many 
rigid behaviors, and even some pathologies, along with all the potential flexibility 
that is within us. As the idea of plasticity becomes the focus of human attention in 
our time, we would be wise to remember that it is a phenomenon that produces 
effects we think of as both bad and good—rigidity and flexibility, vulnerability, 
and an unexpected resourcefulness” (Doidge, 2007). We train neural circuits to 
create mental maps that we use to navigate the world, and if we are stuck in overly 
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bureaucratic, rigid organizational structures, and reinforce those neural circuits for 
years, those become our primary cognitive reference points. Our plastic brains 
adopt the values and norms of the organization if for no other reason than to 
survive. That is what makes it so challenging to influence organizational culture - 
one must shift the culture, before it shifts you.  
 
The other challenge in changing the brain is that plasticity declines as we age. “As 
we age and plasticity declines, it becomes increasingly difficult for us to change in 
response to the world, even if we want to” (Doidge, 2007). Significant cultural 
shifts can be more challenging as we age, which can be a challenge in traditional 
organizations where leadership maintains its tenure for several decades. Our 
brains’ primary function is to keep us alive, and as such, prioritize routine and 
predictability. Coupled with declining plasticity, this reinforces the need for a 
diverse leadership.  
 
4.3 Uncertainty and the brain’s need to know 	
There is often a lot of talk about risk when scholars engage with the topic of 
strategic decision-making. As CEO of Toronto Financial Services Alliance and 
former Ontario Finance Minister Janet Ecker remarked that in a “In an 
increasingly risky world, a CEO needs to be increasingly flexible and adaptable. 
You also need to have a team and know what the latest threat might be” 
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(Israelson, 2016). But commentary like this points to an important distinction 
that must be made when we talk about organizational decision making: there is a 
significant difference between risk, and uncertainty. Speculative reasoning, an 
emerging school of modern philosophy, makes a provocative point about this 
misnomer: 
One can contrast philosophical speculation, which is open-ended, 
with financial speculation, which is always done with the aim of 
ultimately turning a profit. Speculation by hedge funds in today’s 
derivative markets is conceived as a way to calculate and quantify 
risk. By taking account of the laws of probability, investors are able 
to make a profit, no matter what happens in the market. Financial 
speculation is thus a way to manage and control the future. It rests 
on the unquestioned assumption that the future will be 
commensurate with the present. In contrast, metaphysical 
speculation confronts, not risk, but irreducible uncertainty. This 
distinction was first made by the great economist John Maynard 
Keynes. Risk is governed by statistical rules that divide the chances 
among a fixed number of possible outcomes: think of tossing coins or 
throwing dice. But uncertainty cannot be quantified in probabilistic 
terms. We have no way of knowing which outcomes are possible, let 
alone how many of them there are, and how likely any of them is. 
Today, most economists and financial experts ignore Keynes’s 
analysis, and wrongly assume that derivatives and futures markets 
can be understood in terms of risk rather than uncertainty. 
(Shaviro, 2015) (emphasis added) 
 
Today’s world is governed by laws of metaphysical speculation, wherein most 
scenarios have complex critical uncertainties. Yet, our brains are wired to calculate 
risk based on laws of probability. As Peggy Seriès, Senior Lecturer at the 
University of Edinburgh's Computation Cognitive Neuroscience and Psychiatry 
department noted: "To perform optimally, at each moment in time, our brains 
need to combine the current information with prior beliefs, or past experience, so 
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as to form 'best guesses' about what's going on in the world or the best action. In 
mathematical terms, the optimal way is to use probabilities and the framework of 
probabilistic or 'Bayesian' inference" (The University of Edinburgh, 2013). But as 
new technology is formulated and complex problems emerge with which we have 
no past experiences to relate, our ability to form probabilistic hypotheses is 
compromised. We must instead confront uncertainty to make future-facing 
business decisions, which is processed by an entirely different part of the brain. 
 
In the human brain, uncertainty is registered as an ‘error’ by the orbital frontal 
cortex (OFC) (Rock, 2008), which draws attention towards the error and away 
from one’s goals (Hedden & Garbrielli, 2006). Why we resist change is not 
necessarily obvious, and “an individual who is overly distressed by uncertainty 
might legitimize his or her opposition to change by attacking specific features of a 
planned change effort” (2011). Uncertainty manifests implicitly and is processed 
by older brain structures, and “the explicit opinions serve only as creative 
rationalizations” (ibid). And implicit attitudes usually trump explicit ones:  
Logical discourse is unlikely to be effective since it does not address 
the underlying implicit attitude that is actually driving the 
resistance to change. In addition, implicit and explicit attitudes are 
fundamentally different in terms of when and how they are 
produced in the brain. Implicit attitudes arise first, are affectively 
loaded, and remain largely outside of consciousness. Because they 
arise first, they can short-circuit other beneficial nonconscious and 
conscious processing. Thus, implicit attitudes can be especially 
pernicious since they can distort subsequent cognitive processing 
and bias our decisions and behaviours in detrimental ways. (ibid) 
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Thus, implicit attitudes are more stubborn, underpinning attitudes that oft go 
unnoticed but are significant to the way that we process uncertainty. They are 
however, incredibly challenging to detect, articulate, and monitor, making it 
challenging to develop integrate into systemic organizational culture change 
efforts. However, the argument can be made that strategic foresight offers a way 
of mitigating implicit attitudes, as they have a powerful galvanizing effect. In his 
book Competitive Advantage, Michael Porter refers to strategic foresight “a 
powerful device for taking account of uncertainty in making strategic choices” 
(Porter, 1985).  
 
But there is potentially a dark side to futures thinking as a means of mitigating 
uncertainty. Take scenarios, for example. Scenarios use narrative to build powerful 
images of the futures. Scenarios are powerful because they evoke a sense of 
empathy. They often use personas with whom we can relate, drawing compelling 
connections between characters in the future and our own lives. But scenarios can 
also be highly triggering and “yield mixed psychological effects, some of which 
might actually impair judgment and decision making” (Healy and Hodgkinson, 
2007). For better or for worse, strategically speaking, scenarios have the potential 
of being highly persuasive. And because implicit attitudes play such a significant 
role in mediating uncertainty, the brain may reflexively reject futures thinking as 
an evolutionary response. Neuroscience may help us understand why many 
organizations seem to be held back by mental models that are biased towards the 
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past, and are “vague or based on faulty assumptions about the future” (Hines & 
Bishop, 2006); because even when confronted about evidence of impending 
futures, the brain has an evolutionary mandate to err on the side of caution.  
 
A strong future-facing organizational culture must be cognizant “of the anxiety 
and decisional stress that can arise when users imagine and simulate future threats 
with scenarios,” (Healey and Hodgkinson, 2007) and find ways mitigate the 
neurological triggers associated with uncertainty. Any theoretical consideration of 
organizational culture must tackle the human factors associated with decision 
making, and the neurological conditions that limit or expand our cognitive 
capacity for abstraction, innovative thinking, and long-term strategic 
considerations.  
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5.0    RESEARCH DESIGN  
 
Without memory, there is no culture. Without memory, there would be no civilization, 
no society, no future.  
 
ELIE WIESEL 
 
 
5.1 Measuring Strategic Foresight: Capability Maturity Models 		
What began as a means of establishing success metrics in the software industry, 
maturity models help us to create a sense of measurement for qualitative aspects of 
an organization that are otherwise tough to measure. In 1986, a man by the name 
of Watts Humphrey set out to create an evaluation of software subcontractors 
based on specific criteria. In the past, evaluations were ad-hoc and lacked rigour 
and consistency. "The premise was that if developers use practices that have been 
determined to be 'best practices' in the field, the probability that the resulting 
system or product would have a chance of working would be higher and would 
reduce the risk of investment in the program overall” (Grim 2009). Thus, the U.S. 
Department of Defense collaborated with Carnegie Melon University to develop 
the Capability Maturity Model Carnegie Mellon University, 1994). Capability 
maturity models help to add a sense of scientific measurement to qualitative 
processes and create benchmarks within a sector. They help formalize practices 
and suggest a roadmap to optimize them. Maturity models help us to articulate 
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best practices and encourage organizations to continuously improve, maturing 
over time.  
 
The Foresight Maturity Model (FMM) functions is a centralized reference for 
good futures work and unifies the language of foresight (Grim, 2009). Developed 
by Terry Grim, a futures student of the University of Houston, Partner at 
Foresight Alliance, and IBM alumni, the FMM serves to answer questions like 
“What does good futures work look like? How to excel at futures work? What is the level 
of the current practice so that it can be compared to other enterprises, so changes can be 
demonstrated over time?” (Ibid) Furthermore, it captures what informal practices 
look like relative to deeply embedded practices that lead the industry. 
 
The Foresight Maturity Model engages the following six disciplines to define the 
best practices within the field of foresight: 
1. Leadership: Helping organizations to translate foresight into action...on 
an ongoing basis. 2. Framing: Helping the organization identify and solve 
the right problems. 3. Scanning: Helping organizations to understand 
what's going on in its immediate environment and in the world at large. 4. 
Forecasting: Helping organizations consider a range of future possibilities. 
5. Visioning: Helping organizations decide what they want in the future. 
6. Planning: Helping people develop plans, people, skills, and processes 
that support the organization's vision. (Grim, 2009) 
 
Where framing, scanning, forecasting, visioning, and planning are specific 
disciplines or phases in a typical foresight practice or project, leadership stands as 
more of a latent state, one that must prevail in order for all the other disciplines to 
exist. Grim describes Leadership as the “Clear ownership and active leadership to 
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implement and institutionalize foresight capability,” highlighting five primary 
leadership activities: 
1. Engage people in conscious and thoughtful actions to proactively create 
the future they have chosen. 
2. Create an environment that provides timely anticipation of change, 
embracing positive changes and responding creatively to negative changes. 
3. Communicate clearly the goals, results, and implications of foresight 
activities. 
4. Create an environment and processes that drive foresight knowledge into 
action. 
5. Recognize the cultural artifacts and mental models operating in the 
organization and how they influence organizational decisions. 
 
While leadership is not synonymous with culture per se, this discipline best 
captures the relationship between people and the foresight process, the willingness 
to engage in foresight activities, and the way foresight is carried out within the 
organization. One concern around the Grim model is that leadership cannot exist 
in a silo. Foresight stewardship must exist throughout an organization, across all 
disciplines. It invokes the idea that leadership in the context of foresight exists 
separately from other stages of the process, rather than be embedded in every 
stage. It is this integration of leadership that helps to drive foresight processes, 
and does not capture the more profound cultural context of foresight maturity.  
 
Grim’s model also offers a much more explicit, formalized approach to strategic 
foresight. It can be argued that a strong, forward-facing culture implicitly drive 
many of the practices articulated in the FMM, without being formalized in the 
organization’s executive handbook. That is to say, an organization may innately be 
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future-facing, but they do not necessarily employ the labels invoked by the 
foresight community.  
 
Another instrument was developed by Danish scholar René Rohrbeck, whose 
work with Deutsche Telekom Laboratories and Volkswagen received 
international acclaim. Adapted from George S. Day and Paul J.H. Schoemaker’s 
2005 work entitled Scanning The Periphery, Rohrbeck’s approach to culture centres 
around an organization’s capacity and commitment to execute on foresight as a 
core component of strategy. In this context, Rohrbeck’s model aims “to describe 
the extent to which the corporate culture supports or hinders the foresight effort.” 
He calls upon four elements derived from Day and Schoemaker, namely: 
1. Organization’s attitude toward periphery 
2. Readiness to listen to external sources  
3. Willingness to share across functions 
4. Willingness to challenge assumptions 
 
A fifth element, Informal diffusion of insights, was observed by Rohrbeck in 
organizations that struggled with formal foresight processes, but still managed to 
maintain strong track records in “times of discontinuous change” (Rohrbeck, 
2011).  Focused largely on capability (I would rather say "attitude"), Rohrbeck 
sees culture as an enabler of corporate foresight systems, and in some cases, these 
cultural elements can replace formal foresight processes. On culture, Rohrbeck 
remarks: “it can be argued that if a company manages to encourage (through 
cultural means) its employees to be open to external information and to diffuse it 
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effectively throughout the company, then it can be expected that this will support 
strongly its ability to retain a competitive advantage in times of discontinuous 
change” (Rohrbeck, 2011). As such, Rohrbeck sees information diffusion of 
foresight as evidence of existing foresight culture. 
 
Both of these models tip their hats at the cultural elements of a mature foresight 
practice, gently teasing at the activities most commonly associated with foresight, 
but without a formal interpretation of the role that culture plays in the maturity of 
foresight activities.   
5.2 Rationale & Methodology 	
Several tools exist to assess strategic foresight maturity and organizational culture, 
respectively. To establish whether there is a relationship between organizational 
culture and strategic foresight, empirical data will be gathered around foresight 
maturity and organizational values and norms.  
 
By first assessing foresight maturity, and then cross referencing maturity with 
values and norms established in the field of organizational culture research, we can 
form a theoretical understanding of potential best practices for creating future-
facing culture. Both instruments will be administered in the form of an online 
questionnaire, using a platform called Typeform. The questionnaire will consist of 
83 questions, which can be completed in approximately forty-five minutes. The 
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first half of the assessment will ask participants to evaluate foresight maturity, and 
the second presents them with a list of norms and values gathered from various 
culture assessment instruments, and asks participants to rate them using a Likert 
scale.  
5.2.1 Foresight Maturity 	
Participants were asked to assess the foresight maturity of their respective 
organizations using an amended version of Terry Grim’s Foresight Maturity 
Model (FMM). Using components from René Rohrbeck’s Corporate Foresight 
Maturity Model, the FMM was adapted to include a more robust assessment of 
human factors, specifically: internal and external networks, the development of a 
healthy scanning climate within the organization, and the inclusion of a range of 
stakeholders in the futuring process.  
 
5.2.2 Organizational Culture 	
Using a Likert scale, participants were asked to rate how strongly certain values 
and norms reflected the organization they were assessing, on a scale of Not at 
all  to Very Much So. These values and norms were compiled from a couple of 
organizational culture instruments, namely, the OCP, OCAI, as well as some 
norms contributed by the researcher through extensive research. These were 
factors that appeared to be missing from these instruments but represented strong 
themes in the strategic foresight literature. The goal of this structure was to 
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establish the relationship between the values and norms associated with 
organizations that practice great foresight, or conversely, those values and norms 
associated with a particularly weak foresight practice.  
 
5.2.3 Participant Criteria 	
Criteria for selecting participants were that individuals a) needed to be trained in 
strategic foresight or have considerable experience using foresight methods in an 
organizational setting; b) have intimate knowledge of the organization and be able 
reflect on their culture; and c) be working or have worked in a consultative 
capacity in order to gather a sample of foresight consultants or futurists, who work 
closely with organizations for the purpose of establishing foresight as a strategic 
practice. The logic here was that consultants are well positioned to observe and 
navigate organizational culture, and thus reasonably reflect on the way the 
organization works, but that they were not so close that they suffered Icarus 
Paradox-like symptoms.  
 
Participants were approached via the Association of Professional Futurists (APF). 
Founded in 2002, the APF is self-described as “...a growing community of 
professional futurists dedicated to promoting professional excellence and 
demonstrating the value of futures thinking” in “global corporations, small 
businesses, consultancies, education, non-profits and government” (APF, 2016).  
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5.2.4 Synthesis & Analysis 	
After assessing their foresight maturity, each organization’s cultural dimensions 
will be filtered through a social neuroscience model for collaboration, called 
SCARF. Emerging from NeuroLeadership principles, SCARF identifies five 
areas that impact collaboration in groups on a neurological level; Status, Certainty, 
Autonomy, Relatedness, and Fairness (Rock, 2008). By filtering cultural dimensions 
through a collaboration model built on social neuroscience principles, we can start 
to understand which parts of the brain are stimulated with threat or reward 
responses in relation to the organization’s foresight maturity. How the brain reacts 
in organizations with lower foresight maturity versus organizations with higher 
foresight maturity will help us understand which triggers the brain are subject to 
in these environments. 
 
5.3 High-Level Findings: Foresight maturity and organizational culture 	
While observing cultural similarities and differences is valuable, the prima facie 
observation of values and norms only tells part of the story. Values and norms 
represent the explicit attitudes of the organization, which can then be analyzed 
further to develop some understanding of the implicit ones.  It tells us that 
participants in the research - in this case consultants, were exposed to these values 
and able to identify them.  But indeed it does not imply a causal relationship, and 
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as discussed previously, these dimensions in and of themselves do not reveal the 
deeper human compulsions that have subconscious neurological implications.   
 
While this work is not in pursuit of the causes of strategic myopia (as outlined in 
previous chapters, there are many causes woven into the complex system that is 
organizational culture), it is interested in alternative ways of making sense of 
organizational culture dimensions as they relate to our neurobiological experience 
of foresight.  
 
5.3.1 The Participants  	
The sample was made up of data from ten organizations across a range of 
different sectors. The organization with the highest foresight maturity was from 
the Oil & Energy sector, whilst the lowest foresight maturity was found in a 
Political Organization.  Figure 8 (on the following page) breaks down the sample 
according to the sector in which they reside.  
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Figure 8: Foresight maturity levels across sample 
 
 
 
The average foresight maturity was 2.14, whilst the median was 2.77. On average, 
the survey took 46 minutes and 26 seconds for participants to complete online.  
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5.3.2 High(er) Foresight Maturity Organizations 	
It is important to note that across the entire sample, the highest foresight maturity 
was 3.69 (out of a maximum of 5), which does not provide a fully representative 
sample from which we can draw conclusive observations. The range of data 
collected however, can give us a relative sense of how culture might shift as an 
organization’s foresight maturity increases, and potentially form some helpful 
observations from which we can work. Figure 9, on the following page, breaks 
down the foresight maturity of C-10, the organization with the highest maturity 
score in the sample.  
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Figure 9: Foresight maturity of C-10, organization in the Oil & Energy sector 
 
The participant assessing the highest-scoring organization (3.69 maturity), which 
is a company in the oil & energy sector, identified ‘bottom lines’ as their 
obsession; the company that scored second-highest (3.2 maturity), a public safety 
organization, identified ‘protecting the public in an effective and cost-efficient 
way’ as their core obsession; and a management consultancy came in as the third-
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most mature organization (3.12 maturity), and identified ‘useful substance’ as 
their core obsession.   
 
Culturally speaking, those organizations on the higher end of the foresight 
maturity spectrum seem to have very few dimensions in common. Only two 
dimensions were common across all three higher-ranking organizations; 
‘Organization presents the same externally to customers and stakeholders as it 
does internally to staff’; and ‘Avoidance; members deflect and dodge difficult 
conversations’ to which all organizations did not identify with. The spirit of these 
two dimensions could reflect a desire to represent authentic organizational values 
both throughout and outside the organization.  While this is deduced rather than 
definitive, all three scored considerably higher on the maturity practices that relate 
to people & networks, and / or leadership, implying that there may play an 
emphasis on their networks, scanning the periphery, and ensuring communication 
across channels.  
 
Interestingly, however, all three of these organizations were identified as being 
neutral towards the ‘willingness to challenge assumptions’ dimension in the 
foresight maturity assessment. On the likert scale used in the cultural assessment, 
neutrality towards a particular dimension is the midpoint between strongly disagree 
and strongly agree, and two out of three of these higher-foresight maturity 
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organizations were identified as neutral.  So it is fair to say that at this stage of 
maturity, organizations do not encourage their members challenge assumptions.  
 
5.3.3 Low(er) Foresight Maturity Organizations 	
One broad observation was that organizations with lower foresight maturity tend 
to have very mechanistic, ego-centric obsessions. For example, the lowest scoring 
organization (C-11), a political group with a 0.69 maturity (out of a possible 5) 
cited “Gaining advantage internally within the party” as their driving force. Figure 
10 (on the following page), breaks down C-11 foresight maturity across all 
disciplines.  
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Figure 10: Foresight maturity of C-11, a political organization 
 
 
 
Likewise, the second-lowest scoring organization (coming it at 1.23 foresight 
maturity) cited ‘legacy’ as its driving force. The third lowest-scoring organization 
(1.72 foresight maturity) described an obsession with hierarchy and safety; Senior 
executives are obsessed with bonuses, mid-level staff with growing and advancing, 
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working level staff are obsessed with doing a good job, and support staff were 
obsessed with keeping the jobs they had. 
 
Common to these low foresight-maturity organizations is a distinct lack of 
experimentation, playfulness, and curiosity. They are all identified as power-
oriented, conventional, and oppositional (meaning, new ideas and strategy are 
often met with resistance). Participants reflected that none of their respective 
organizations fostered a provocative or stimulating environment, or that they 
made scientific decisions based on empirical or measurable evidence.  
 
These low-foresight maturity organizations seem to all share a lack of 
encouragement and reward system for divergent thinking. None of these 
organizations were identified by participants as encouraging their people to 
challenge the status quo, which fits in with their more traditional, conventional 
approaches, and reflects the reality that these organizations are highly detached 
from new ideas. Core to the practice of strategic foresight is a willingness to 
consider alternative futures. The lack of such willingness coupled with the distinct 
lack of curiosity and playfulness, paints a grim picture as to whether these 
organizations are well-positioned to endure in times of disruption.  
 
Further, and perhaps most discouraging, is that the low-foresight maturity 
organizations were also all reported to be less humanistic and not encouraging of 
self-actualization. Without a safe space for members of an organization to reflect 
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and have their skills nurtured, they are likely to encounter some significant 
cultural challenges and disempower individuals from achieving personal goals. All 
three of the lowest-maturity organizations scored relatively higher in the 
Leadership discipline than all the other disciplines. This paper will delve into the 
neurological implications of these findings in the following chapter.  
 
5.4 Social Neuroscience: A foundation for analysis 	
The human brain is complex, a virtue that extends to the business world when you 
put a bunch of people in a room together and ask them to work towards a 
common goal. Thus far, we have explored how the social laws that govern 
organizational culture— human factors like reactions to uncertainty, approaches 
to problem-solving, and propensity to change— are all moderated by the brain’s 
implicit attitudes, forming organizational dynamics. The word dynamics here is 
critical; organizational culture is constantly changing over time, but also shifts 
according to whomever is in the room. These dynamics are dialectical in nature, 
and both shape, and are shaped by, individual experiences. To consider foresight 
an the organizational context, we need to first consider how futures thinking 
impacts us on an individual level (Eriksson & Weber, 2008), and further, how 
those brain insights can be applied to group theory. “The study of the brain, 
particularly within the field of social, cognitive and affective neuroscience is 
starting to provide some underlying brain insights that can be applied in the real 
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world” (Lieberman, 2007). Though challenging to identify and influence, 
understanding the way the human brain reacts to stimulus in its environment can 
help us reveal barriers and opportunities to thinking about the future. Indeed, 
studying the brain through “...social, cognitive and affective neuroscience” (Rock, 
2008) is revealing insight about the real world; the way humans relate to one 
another, to themselves, and to their places of work (Lieberman, 2007).  
 
To interpret the data collected about organizational culture through a social 
neuroscience lens, I used a tool called SCARF. The following is a breakdown of 
the principles; 
Status is about relative importance to others. Certainty concerns 
being able to predict the future. Autonomy provides a sense of 
control over events. Relatedness is a sense of safety with others, of 
friend rather than foe. And fairness is a perception of fair exchanges 
between people. These five domains activate either the ‘primary 
reward’ or ‘primary threat’ circuitry (and associated networks) of 
the brain. For example, a perceived threat to one’s status activates 
similar brain networks to a threat to one’s life. In the same way, a 
perceived increase in fairness activates the same reward circuitry as 
receiving a monetary reward. (Ibid) 
 
These criteria emerged from two core premises 1) that social behaviour is largely 
governed by the principles of minimizing threat and maximizing reward (Gordon, 
2000), and 2) the same neural networks that govern primary survival needs (like 
food and water) are the very same networks used to minimize threats and 
maximize rewards (Lieberman and Eisenberger, 2008). This tells us that some of 
the values and norms that make up the fibre of an organization’s culture could be 
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activating the same neural networks that are used to process primal needs. While 
that can be a positive thing (i.e. triggering the reward response), there is a dark 
side; values and norms that trigger the threat response essentially “...activates 
similar brain networks to a threat to one’s life” (Rock, 2008). Further, values and 
norms that are contradictory could create a highly exhausting, frustrating 
environment for members whose brains cycle between threat and reward 
responses at work.  
 
Evaluating the values and norms associated with both low- and high-maturity 
foresight practices through the SCARF framework can help us understand how 
workplace dynamics impact individuals and reinforce patterns of behaviour within 
an organization.  The ‘minimize danger and maximize reward’ principle (see 
Figure 11) is critical organizing principle of the brain (Gordon, 2000), which 
David Rock, author of SCARF: a brain-based model for collaborating with and 
influencing others describes as “...analogous to a concept that has appeared in the 
literature for a long time: the approach-avoid response.” Rock extrapolates further;  
This principle represents the likelihood that when a person 
encounters a stimulus their brain will either tag the stimulus as 
‘good’ and engage in the stimulus (approach), or their brain will tag 
the stimulus as ‘bad’ and they will disengage from the stimulus 
(avoid). If a stimulus is associated with positive emotions or 
rewards, it will likely lead to an approach response; if it is 
associated with negative emotions or punishments, it will likely 
lead to an avoid response. (Rock, 2008) 
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Figure 11: Minimizing Danger, Maximizing Reward (Gordon, 2000, and Rock, 2008) 
 
The approach-avoid principle is critical to the discourse around foresight culture 
for three reasons. One, is that strategic foresight triggers the fear of “engaging 
with the outside, and fear of the future” (Burt & Van der Heijden, 2003), which 
implies that foresight in an organizational setting could be triggering a threat 
response in the brain. And the second is that this work points to a definition of 
organizational culture that is inextricably linked to strategic foresight - culture as 
the internal capacity to process external/environmental ambiguity. And the third is 
that the differential between threat and reward could reveal some valuable 
opportunities for foresight intervention; that is to say, the need to reduce the 
former and increase the latter simultaneously could reveal critical opportunities to 
trigger shifts in organizational behaviour.  
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Threat- and reward-responses also trigger the release of different hormones in the 
brain, which impact cognitive capacity. In the avoid state, we typically see a surge 
in cortisol, which researchers believe can harden the neural pathways connecting 
the hippocampus and the amygdala such that the brain becomes 'hard-wired' to 
be in a constant fight-or-flight state (Chetty et. al., 2014). Leading the research 
was Daniela Kaufer, UC Berkeley Associate Professor of Integrative Biology, who 
said “You can imagine that if your amygdala and hippocampus are better 
connected, that could mean that your fear responses are much quicker, which is 
something you see in stress survivors. On the other hand, if your connections are 
not so good to the prefrontal cortex, your ability to shut down responses is 
impaired. So, when you are in a stressful situation, the inhibitory pathways from 
the prefrontal cortex telling you not to get stressed don’t work as well as the 
amygdala shouting to the hippocampus, ‘This is terrible!’ You have a much bigger 
response than you should.” (Sanders, 2014). Hormones like oxytocin, serotonin, 
dopamine, norepinephrine are secreted in the approach state, which are known to 
increase trust, satisfaction, and competence (Rheeder, 2015). Figure 12 illustrates 
the benefits of each of these hormones.  
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Figure 12: Hormones secreted in the approach state (Rheeder, 2015) 
 
 
Changes in brain chemistry can impact the amount of resources the brain has to 
tackle complex, non-linear problems. Conventional cognitive thinking wisdom 
tells us that there is a formula to be followed when we solve problems. In the 
software world, we call this the ‘waterfall method,’ wherein one goes through a 
discovery period, gathering and analyzing data. One then frames the problem, 
establishing its boundaries and limiting its scope. And using this information, a 
solution is designed and implemented. Figure 13 visualizes traditional wisdom for 
linear problem-solving. 
 
 
 
Figure 13: Traditional wisdom for solving complex problems – the ‘waterfall’  (Guindon, 1991) 
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A 1991 study conducted at the Microelectronics and Computer Technology 
Corporation (MCC) headquartered in Austin, Texas, examined the cognitive 
processes in problem solving and rather unsurprisingly revealed that the reality is 
not very linear at all. A team of designers was asked to design an elevator control 
system for an office building, all of whom were expert designers but had no 
specific industry knowledge. They were asked to vocalize their thoughts as they 
worked through the problem, and sessions were videotaped and later analyzed 
(Guindon, 1991). Analysis revealed that designers focused on 1) understanding 
the problem, and 2) formulating a solution (Conklin & Weil, 2007). The 
researchers then mapped their thinking processes against the waterfall method of 
problem solving and found patterns that were “both chaotic, for obvious reasons, 
and opportunity-driven, because in each moment the designers are seeking the 
best opportunity to progress toward a solution,” (ibid) as captured in Figure 14 
below.   
 
 
Figure 14: Seismograph; Actual pattern of problem-solving activity (Guindon, 1991) 
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When you add another brain into the mix, a second designer, the problem-solving 
process becomes that much more convoluted. Each member generates a cognitive 
map that shifts between problem finding and framing, to exploring possible 
solutions. Figure 15 demonstrates the presence of two designers and their 
respective problem-solving patterns MCC study: 
 
Figure 15: Seismograph; pattern of problem-solving activity when a second designers is added to a 
wicked-design project (Guindon, 1991) 
 
The problem proposed in this exercise was complicated, not complex or wicked. 
And still, arriving at a solution demands non-linear cognitive capacity. 
Approaching problems, especially in collaborative settings with multiple human 
factors in play, demands significant cognitive capacity. In a heightened threat 
state, the brain is deprived of the necessary resources, decreasing the ability to 
detect nuances and think creatively about problems.  
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Understanding the cognitive processes that take place in the face of uncertainty, 
and how collaboration, reasoning, and problem solving are carried out  in the 
brain, can help us to foster the optimal neurological conditions for longer-term 
strategic thinking.  
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6.0     DATA INTERPRETATION 
 
Optimism is a strategy for making a better future. Because unless you believe that the 
future can be better, you are unlikely to step up and take responsibility for making it so.  
 
NOAM CHOMSKY 
 
 
 
On their own, organizational culture dimensions give us insight into the explicit 
attitudes present within an organization. This is useful, but does not adequately 
lend itself to an understanding the implicit attitudes present in the organization. 
The SCARF model helps us to view organizational culture dimensions through a 
more social neuroscience lens.  SCARF gives us the framework to build an 
understanding of implicit attitudes by filtering which cultural dimensions trigger a 
threat response in the brain, and which trigger a reward response.  
 
6.1 Reducing Neurological Barriers 	
Part of the challenge in identifying implicit attitudes is that they are governed by 
subjectivity. Informed by experiences, implicit attitudes are formed in the limbic 
system and do not reflect future considerations. As they are reflexive and 
unconscious, it may not always be clear how implicit attitudes are triggered by 
environmental stimulus. One of the few ways to conclusively measure implicit 
attitudes is to measure brain activity in the brain in response to various stimuli 
using an fMRI machine.  
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We can, however, reasonably associate some cultural dimensions with threat- and 
reward-responses triggered in the brain, as articulated through the SCARF 
model. The brainstem-limbic system is designed to reflexively, unconsciously, and 
continuously minimize danger and maximize reward as we move through the 
world. The brain uses the same circuitry for social interactions as we do for 
physical danger and rewards, and as such, “someone feeling threatened by a boss, 
who is undermining their credibility, is less likely to be able to solve complex 
problems and more likely to make mistakes” (Rock, 2008). Strategic foresight 
initiatives are inherently complex, demanding the neurological dexterity to 
consider multiple human systems concurrently.  
 
The SCARF model provides us with a framework that helps us to better 
understand the implicit attitudes emerging from the limbic system, and provide 
some cues as to how to build more rewarding leadership practices. When we look 
at organizational culture dimensions in high (and low) foresight maturity 
organizations through the SCARF lens, we can start to understand the conditions 
associated for both weak and strong foresight practices. The cultural dimensions 
have been organized to reflect the kind of neurological response we might expect 
when exposed to that dimension in the workplace. What emerged is a kind of 
scoresheet for the social neuroscience of organizational culture, allowing us to get 
a sense of the kind of neurological environment that is best suited for futures 
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thinking.  For a complete breakdown of how all the cultural dimensions were 
categorized according to SCARF principles, see Appendix C.  
 
Each set of data was filtered according to whether the dimension triggers a reward 
response or a threat response. For example, aggression emerges from a desire to 
impose social dominance over others and enforce hierarchy, thus, a workplace that 
is defined by aggression subconsciously threatens the status of its members. On 
the other hand, a participatory environment, where members are actively included 
in conversations, bolsters one’s status and ignites a reward response in the brain.  
 
In cases where participatory strongly failed to represent the organization’s core 
values, members of the organization face “a reduction in status resulting from 
being left out of an activity lit up the same regions of the brain as physical pain 
(Eisenberger et al., 2003). Likewise, when an organization holds management to 
the same rigorous standards as other members of the organization, it triggers a 
reward response, satisfying our desire for fairness. Unfair exchanges, on the other 
hand, stimulate a significant threat response (Tabibnia & Lieberman, 2007), so 
participants who strongly did not identify this quality with their respective 
organization would have this dimension filed as a reward in the scoring process. 
When someone is perceived as unfair, it breaks down one’s ability to empathize, 
further triggering threat responses in the brain (Singer et. al., 2006).  
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6.2 SCARF Results 
 
 
Figure 16: Mapping Threat- and Reward Response-Triggering Cultural Dimensions Against 
Foresight Maturity 
 
 
The sample ranged from a foresight maturity level of 0.69 to the highest score of 
3.69, yielding an average foresight maturity of 2.14. The median maturity was 
2.77. Figure 16, Mapping Threat- and Reward Response-Triggering Cultural 
Dimensions Against Foresight Maturity captures all of the organizations in the 
sample, with their respective levels of threat-triggering dimensions marked in red, 
and reward-triggering dimensions marked in green. Generally speaking, there is a 
positive correlation between organizations that stimulate more reward-responses 
in their members, and the maturity of the organization’s foresight practice.  
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6.2.1 High(er) Foresight Maturity Organizations 	
Across the three organizations with highest foresight maturity (C-10; 3.69, C-01; 
3.2, and C-05; 3.12, respectively), all of them reflected more reward response-
triggering values and norms. For comparison’s sake, Figure 17 (on the following 
page) captures the threat- and reward-response levels across the three 
organizations with the highest foresight maturity; C-10, C-01, C-05, respectively.  
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Figure 17: Comparing SCARF results across the three organizations with the highest foresight maturity 
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The top foresight maturity organization, C-10 from the Oil & Energy sector, did 
have a very close margin however, with 15 threat response triggering dimensions 
and 16 reward response triggering dimensions, which could suggest that some 
balance of threat and reward responses is helpful in future-facing organizational 
culture (see Figure 18 below). Without more context however, it is tricky to 
understand the nuances of such a balance in threat and reward triggers. 
 
 
 
Figure 18: Threat- and Reward-Responses in C-10 
 
 
Generally, this organization’s cultural dimensions were quite evenly distributed 
across all five SCARF principles, with slightly more emphasis on Certainty, which 
featured five reward-inducing dimensions (values; communicative; disciplined; not 
perfectionistic, and norms; scientific; and fast-moving and responsive.) and 
Relatedness, which featured five threat-inducing dimensions (values; not 
participatory, and norms; siloed; not playful; not self-actualizing; and not humanistic. 
Figure 19 shows a complete breakdown of the cultural dimensions and their 
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respective neurological responses for C-10, to serve as an example of how the 
analysis of cultural dimensions was carried out.  
 
 
 
Figure 19: Distribution cultural dimensions across SCARF principles, for C-10 
 
 
From the Public Safety sector, C-01 was the second highest foresight maturity 
organization, which came in at 3.2 (out of a maximum of 5) and had a much more 
significant discrepancy between threat- and reward-triggering values and norms, 
with 13 threat-response dimensions and 20 reward-response dimensions (see 
Figure 20, on the following page). 
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Figure 20: Threat- and Reward-Responses in C-01 
 
This indicates that overall, the organization’s culture likely tends to trigger more 
reward responses in its members, and fosters an environment that triggers fewer 
threat responses. It too was fairly balanced across all five SCARF principles, 
though the participant identified five reward-response dimensions in the 
Certainty category (values; consistent; disciplined; and risky; and norms: fast-moving; 
not risky; and not competitive), and did not identify any threat-response 
dimensions. This indicates a strong sense of “being able to control the future” 
(Rock 2008), job security, and members’ sense of value to the organization. The 
other strong category for C-01 was also Relatedness, whereby five reward-response 
dimensions were recorded (values; participatory; highly loyal, committed; and 
empathetic; and norms; humanistic; and not avoidant) and only two thread-response 
dimensions (both norms; siloed; and not playful). 
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C-05, The organization with the third-highest foresight maturity is a 
Management Consultancy with a score of 3.12. It too had a significantly high 
ratio of reward-triggering cultural dimensions to threat-triggering cultural 
dimensions (see Figure 21, below).  
 
 
Figure 21: Threat- and Reward-Responses in C-05 
 
 
 
A total of 19 reward-response dimensions were recorded, and 5 threat response 
dimensions. The strongest category was Autonomy, with five reward-response 
dimensions (values; not controlled; not traditional; and norms; curious; rewards 
divergent thinking; and not dependent on management.) and only two threat-
response dimensions (both values; conventional; and not trusting). This was closely 
followed by Relatedness, with four reward-response dimensions recorded (values; 
empathetic; and norms; self-actualizing, not siloed; and not avoidant.) It is worth 
noting that Certainty nearly tied with Relatedness, reflecting four reward-response 
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dimensions (values; communicative; risky; and perfectionistic; and norms; not 
disciplined; and scientific) and only one threat-response norm (not disciplined). All 
three highest foresight maturity organizations had a few reward-response 
dimensions in common that are worth reflecting upon. Three of these 
commonalities were in the Fairness category of SCARF. All three shared a 
common commitment representing the organization the same way both externally 
and internally to its members. This would seem to demonstrate a desire to appear 
transparent, even authentic, to all those who engage with the organization. All 
three organizations also do not present with an oppositional culture, where new ideas 
and strategic directions are shot down. This would imply that the organization is 
open to exploring alternative strategies, which is a crucial component of a future-
facing organizational culture. The other dimension common to all three of the 
highest foresight maturity organization was a lack of consensus-seeking. 
Categorically, this triggers a threat response in members that concede this to be 
unjust. But in combination with not being oppositional, this reflects the 
organizations’ ability to hear multiple ideas and strategies, but not require all the 
members to agree on a strategic direction. Not only does that represent an 
important strategic imperative in the business world, it is also provides the right 
conditions for strong scenario planning.  
 
All three were also identified as not being avoidant, that is to say, members of the 
organization do not deflect and dodge difficult conversations. An organizational 
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culture is willing to tackle challenging, complex realities is critical for 
conversations around alternative futures, and represents the kind of agility that is 
highly characteristic of future-facing culture. Not being avoidant is also a crucial 
step towards confronting the fear of uncertainty that organizations face in times of 
exponential change.  
 
6.2.2 Low(er) Foresight Maturity Organizations 	
The three organizations with the lowest foresight maturity (C-11; 0.69, C-12; 
1.23, and C-08; 1.72, respectively) had the inverse relationship of the highest 
foresight maturity organizations. All of these organizations triggered far more 
threat-responses in the brain, and unlike their higher foresight maturity 
counterparts, this was very consistent across all three. Figure 22, on the following 
page, compares the threat- and reward-responses across the three lowest foresight 
maturity-ranking organizations in the sample.  
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Figure 22: Comparing SCARF results across the three organizations with the lowest foresight maturity 
 
 
C-11, a Political Organization that scored the lowest foresight maturity with just 
0.69. It was recorded as having 24 threat-response cultural dimensions and 7 
reward-response triggering dimensions (see Figure 23, on the following page).  
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Figure 23: Threat- and Reward-Responses in C-11 
 
 
 
The reward responses were fairly negligible, with three dimensions in both the 
Status and Fairness SCARF categories, and absolutely no reward-responses in the 
Autonomy and Relatedness categories. Particularly notable was the high 
concentration of threat-response dimensions that were recorded in the Autonomy 
category (values; traditional; conventional; procedural; not trusting; and norms; not 
rewarding of divergent thinking; not curious; not experimental). Likewise in the 
Relatedness category, another 6 threat-response dimensions were identified (all 
norms; siloed; avoidant; not playful; not self-actualizing; not humanistics; and not 
empathetic.)  
 
The second-lowest foresight maturity organization was C-12, with score of 1.23. 
The organization was recorded as having a whopping 30 threat-response 
dimensions, and 7 reward-response triggering dimensions (see Figure 24).  
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Figure 24: Threat- and Reward-Responses in C-12 
 
 
 
 
Similarly to C-11, this organization lacked reward-response triggering dimensions 
in some categories, namely Autonomy, Relatedness, and Fairness. Thus, all 7 
reward-response triggering dimensions were divided between Status and 
Certainty. The most threat-response laden SCARF category was Autonomy, with 
10 dimensions (values; traditional; conventional; controlled; procedural; not trusting; 
and norms; dependent on management; not experimental; not rewarding of divergent 
thinking; not curious; and not provocative or stimulating.) The Relatedness category 
was identified as having 7 threat-response cultural dimensions (values; not loyal / 
committed; not empathetic; and norms; siloed; avoidant; not playful; not self-
actualizing; and not humanistic) 
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C-08 scored 1.72, the third-lowest foresight maturity recorded in the sample. 
This organization had 25 threat-response dimensions and also had just 7 reward-
response triggering dimensions (see Figure 25).  
 
 
Figure 25: Threat- and Reward-Responses in C-08 
 
 
 
This organization had quite sporadic distribution of reward-response triggering 
dimensions, with Autonomy and Relatedness having just one respectively, and 
Fairness reflecting no reward-response dimensions. The Autonomy category 
however, had 9 threat-response dimensions (values; traditional; conventional; 
controlled; procedural; not trusting; and not optimized for productivity; and norms; not 
experimental; not curious; not rewarding of divergent thinking). Another 5 threat-
response dimensions were captured in the Relatedness category (values; not 
empathetic; and norms; siloed; not playful; not self-actualizing; and not humanistic).  
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Unlike the higher foresight-maturity organizations, the organizations with lower 
foresight maturity share a great deal of cultural dimensions in common across all 
SCARF dimensions. It is important to note however, that the dimensions they 
share are all threat-response triggering dimensions. In the Status category, all three 
organizations are highly power-oriented, fail to challenge the status quo, and do 
not engage in humility-inducing activities to discourage hierarchy. In the 
Certainty category, all three organizations are internally competitive, and do not 
make highly scientific, data-driven decisions. All three organizations have the 
most threat-response dimensions in the Autonomy category, meaning that they are 
quite abysmal at empowering their members. They are all highly traditional, 
conventional, and procedural, and not trusting of their members to make 
decisions on behalf of the organization. Unsurprisingly, they do not provide 
experimental environments, and do not reward divergent thinking. These 
organizations lack a curious spirit. The Relatedness category is also full of threat-
response triggering cultural dimensions. All are reported to be highly siloed, not 
playful environments. They are also not very human-centred environments; 
recorded as not humanistic, not self-actualizing, and not placing an importance on 
empathy. In direct inverse of their high-foresight maturity counterparts, all three 
of the lowest-foresight organizations are highly oppositional in the Fairness 
category, meaning, they have an organizational culture that is not amenable to 
new ideas and strategies. 
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6.3 Data Insights 	
Integrative Neuroscientist Evian Gordon identified ‘maximize reward’ and 
‘minimize danger’ as an overarching, central, organizing principle of the brain 
(Gordon, 2000), also known as the approach-avoid response (Rock, 2008). “This 
principle represents the likelihood that when a person encounters a stimulus their 
brain will either tag the stimulus as ‘good’ and engage in the stimulus (approach), 
or their brain will tag the stimulus as ‘bad’ and they will disengage from the 
stimulus (avoid)” (ibid).  The more time the brain spends maximizing rewards, the 
higher the engagement level of members in the organization.  
 
The most provocative insight gleaned from the research is that we generally see 
more reward-response triggering cultural dimensions as foresight maturity increases. 
Specifically, with every 1-point increase in foresight maturity, there is roughly a 
70% increase in the organization’s average reward/threat dimensions (see Figure 
16, Mapping Threat/Reward Cultural Dimensions Against Foresight Maturity, on 
page 79). While we cannot make a statistically significant argument due to the 
small sample size, we can argue that as foresight maturity increases, reward-
response triggering cultural dimensions trend positively.  That is to say, the 
stronger an organization’s foresight maturity, the more time the brain spends in 
the approach state, leading to higher engagement.  
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One could also hypothesize the inverse relationship; for every 70% increase in the 
average of the reward/threat dimensions, the organization’s capacity for strategic 
foresight increases. That is to say, fostering a culture that is more neurologically 
rewarding could actually be prompting stronger foresight practices. In this 
context, more time spent in the approach state could be helping to reduce myopia 
and mitigate uncertainty. “The approach-avoid response is a survival mechanism 
designed to help people stay alive, by quickly and easily remembering what is 
good and bad in the environment,” says Rock (2008). By that logic, nurturing a 
more rewarding organizational culture, wherein members do not feel threatened 
by mundane dynamics in the workplace, frees up our limbic system to grapple 
with the uncertainty of the futures. This supports the hypothesis that nurturing a 
culture which increases the amount of time that members spend in the approach 
state (versus the avoid state) creates the optimal conditions for tackling the 
ambiguity associated with futuring.  
 
In either case, this data tells us that there is a positive relationship between 
neurologically rewarding organizational culture and strong strategic foresight 
practices. This is not surprising, given the significant impact that the approach-
avoid response “can have on perception and problem solving, and the implications 
of this effect on decision-making, stress-management, collaboration, and 
motivation.” (Rock, 2008)  
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This becomes especially clear when we observe the discrepancies between the 
extremes of the sample, the SCARF results of organizations with the lowest 
foresight maturity to those with the highest foresight maturity. Lower-foresight 
maturity organizations are very much defined by the avoid state. When asked what 
C-11, the lowest-ranking organization in the data, was obsessed with, the 
participant identified Trying to gain advantage within the party. This intensely 
individualistic approach activates reward circuitry (specifically, the striatum), 
which releases dopamine for the individual gaining advantage (Izuma et. al., 
2008) but for those not gaining advantage, ignites the same regions of the brain as 
physical pain (Eisenberger et. al., 2003). Both C-12 and C-08, the organizations 
with the second- and third-lowest foresight maturity, identified status-related 
obsessions, demonstrating that organizations dominated by an avoid or threat 
state fail to produce the conditions for effectively considering the future.  
 
On the other end of the spectrum, higher-foresight maturity organizations tend to 
be more obsessed with macro, outward-facing values. C-10, the organization with 
the highest-foresight maturity cited Bottom Lines as their core obsession. While 
not exactly human-centered, this is a core driver that prioritizes momentum and 
growth in the sector. Both C-01 and C-05, the organizations with the second- 
and third-highest foresight maturity, were identified as prioritizing community 
and substance, which both demonstrate a vision for the organization that goes 
beyond the individuals who work there.   
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7.0 FIRST PRINCIPLES  	
First principles is kind of a physics way of looking at the world. You boil things down to 
the most fundamental truths and say, “What are we sure is true?” and then reason up 
from there. Somebody could say, “Battery packs are really expensive and that’s just the 
way they will always be… Historically, it has cost $600 per kilowatt hour. It’s not 
going to be much better than that in the future.”  
 
With first principles, you say, “What are the material constituents of the batteries? What 
is the stock market value of the material constituents?” It’s got cobalt, nickel, aluminum, 
carbon, some polymers for separation and a seal can. Break that down on a material 
basis and say, “If we bought that on the London Metal Exchange what would each of 
those things cost?” It’s like $80 per kilowatt hour. So clearly you just need to think of 
clever ways to take those materials and combine them into the shape of a battery cell and 
you can have batteries that are much, much cheaper than anyone realizes. 
 
ELON MUSK (Quote edited for clarity) 
 
 
7.1 What are First Principles? 	
As Elon Musk explained above (Musk 2013), first principles are a way of reasoning 
only from the data we absolutely know to be true. Most organizations reason from 
analogy, leveraging past learnings and building on previous experiences. They 
allow us to create new understandings of the world based on evidence, rather than 
simply building off of old paradigms. In this context, first principles take on a dual 
purpose; firstly, they offer an alternative way of looking at organizational culture, 
articulating the physiological human factors that inform the way companies make 
decisions under uncertainty; and secondly, they encourage organizations to lead 
from first principles - what they absolutely know to be true about their people, 
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process, and product - rather than arbitrarily trying shift culture by observing other 
companies.  
 
In combination with the extensive literature review, this research has revealed a 
few first principles about the culture of organizations with strong foresight 
practices. Neuroscience allows us to leverage what we know to be true about the 
brain, to build more robust theories around organizational culture. Though each 
organization will have a unique context from which they are operating, they all 
have one thing in common: they are made up of a cluster of brains, working 
towards a common goal. Understanding the science behind how the brain 
responds to stimulus can prompt the story about how a particular organization’s 
dynamics form, revealing some of the levers available to influence organizational 
culture over time.  
 
 
7.2 First Principles of a Future-Facing Organizational Culture 
People without culture feel insecure and are obsessed with the acquisition of material 
things, which give them a temporary security that itself is a delusional bulwark against 
future insecurity. Without culture, a community loses self-awareness and guidance, and 
grows weak and vulnerable. It disintegrates from within as it suffers a lack of identity, 
dignity, self-respect and a sense of destiny. 
WANGARI MAATHAI 
 
ONE  Organizational culture is a wicked, shifting ecosystem 
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An organization’s culture is a sensitive, shifting ecosystem, governed by social and 
cultural laws. The addition or subtraction of one member can greatly influence its 
culture, as can changes in peripheral systems seemingly removed from the 
organization. Circumstances in the personal system of individual member can 
stimulate virtually undetectable shifts in an organization’s culture. As such, the 
conditions need sensitive detection systems for regulating and maintaining an 
engaging culture.  
 
As such, cultivating a future-facing an organizational culture is an ongoing 
process, for which there is no real ‘end.’ We do not really arrive, there are simply 
opportunities to adjust the social trajectory towards a more desirable (future) state. 
As a living system that is in a constant state of flux, members (and in particular, 
leaders) must be sensitive to shifts in the ecosystem that could be activating 
significant threat responses or failing to activate adequate reward responses. Any 
assessment of organizational culture is simply a snapshot of a moment in time. 
When we evaluate culture, we have a tendency of letting that data represent the 
organization almost dogmatically. The dynamics that emerge when there are even 
subtle shifts internally or externally, have the capacity to dramatically impact our 
neurological processing. A future-facing organization must develop a culture of 
self-monitoring, powered by a sense of self-awareness that allows members to be 
sensitive to shifts in the culture that might be causing myopia or negatively 
impacting the organization.  
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In many ways, organizational culture is similar to a fitness regimen; in order to be 
healthy, one needs to get into the habit of exercising regularly and make healthy 
consumption choices every day. In the same way fitness becomes integrated into 
our lifestyles, building a neurologically healthy culture must become part of an 
organization’s daily ritual. When we commit to fitness, it does not mean we quit 
our jobs and all become personal trainers - it means that we make the conscious 
decision to consider our health every single day and work towards our optimal 
self. A future-facing organizational culture is one wherein each member wakes up 
every day with a renewed stake in its company’s vision of the future. To build a 
strong strategic foresight capacity internally is to ask questions like “What can I do 
today to make incremental progress towards our preferred vision of the future,” “Does 
our strategy consider ways to engage with our vision of the future? How might we 
improve our strategy to be more future-facing?” and “What needs to change in society for 
us to make our preferred future happen?” 
 
A term that captures this spirit of this continuous progress towards a future-facing 
organizational culture is Kaizen (改善), the Japanese term for improvement. This 
term was popularized by Toyota, who sought to improve manufacturing processes 
in their plants by engaging all members of the organization - everyone from the 
janitorial staff, to the senior most executives - in an active, intentional effort to 
improve. "The idea is to nurture the company's people as much as it is to praise 
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and encourage participation in kaizen activities" (Bunji, 1995). The idea is that all 
members of the organization need to unite around a common objective.  
 
Engaging an organization in Kaizen is a way of aligning everyone around a shared 
vision, and having that vision become the beacon in the distance that all members 
gaze towards. It ensures that each member has a stake, and it falls under 
everyone’s jurisdiction to work towards that vision regardless of where they sit in 
the company. This points to critical component of a future-facing organization; 
that the collective is greater than the sum of its parts, and that each individual - 
and their respective neurological reflexes - plays a crucial role in imagining, 
planning, and realizing the future.  
 
TWO  The human brain is inherently predictive, but informed by past 
experiences 		
When a ball is launched in a person’s direction, the human brain’s anticipatory 
networks trigger the necessary coordination, best positioning the body to catch it. 
In this scenario, the brain is predicting where the ball is going to land, and 
attempting to be in the right place when it happens. These reflexes are built upon 
past experience; when we experience catching a ball over and over again, our 
brain’s predictive powers increase and our coordination improves.  
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The relationship between memory (and the implicit attitudes that emerge from 
past experiences) and our capacity to imagine future events, tells us a lot about the 
way we form ideas about the future, and “has potentially important implications 
for understanding decision-making and performance under stress where 
conditions such as fatigue may impair the ability to effectively make use of past 
experiences to simulate or predict upcoming events” (ibid). A culture that is 
characterized by threat-response qualities has fewer resources to draw on 
experiences and consider the long view.  
 
THREE There are ideal neurological conditions for considering the long view 
 
 
Navigating the uncertainty of the futures and solving complex problems require 
certain cognitive resources. The brain is deprived of these resources when it is in a 
threatened state; which was the strongly characterized those organizations with a 
less mature foresight practice. This research revealed that taking a strategic 
approach to the future could actually help to brain to mitigate uncertainty. 
Exploring alternative futures with scanning, research, and scenario planning can 
help to bolster confidence in the strategic planning process, and render the 
uncertainty of the future less daunting. Even if scenarios and strategies shift, 
“learning about the environment is the critical tool that successful agents use to 
reduce uncertainty as much as possible" (Chiao, et. al., 2016). Thus, we can see 
strategic foresight– and all the scanning, forecasting, and scenario-planning that 
			
	
	
103 
goes with it– as a way of decreasing uncertainty in the workplace. Working 
towards a preferred future could actually be a way for organizations to decrease 
some of the threat responses triggered by not knowing what the future will bring.  
 
A strong strategic foresight practice can create a more engaged, reward-response 
triggering environment, one that supports the brain’s cognitive performance. Our 
hyper-vigilant amygdala responds more strongly to threats, making it “easier to 
cause aggravation (activate an avoid response) than it is to help others think 
rationally and creatively (the approach response)” (Rock, 2008). If we reduce those 
threats, and use foresight as a means of reducing perceived uncertainty, we can 
create organizational culture that is more rewarding. Strategic foresight also has a 
strong creative component, one that requires the open minds of members to 
engage playfully with possibilities of the future.  
 
The following explores neurological conditions that are optimal for consideration 
of the long view, in that they free up resources in the brain that are required for 
cognitive processes.  
 
Reducing Brain Barriers: The human brain is a complex organ that modern 
medicine has yet to decipher entirely. Yet, what we have learned from fMRI 
imaging has taught us a lot about the ways in which the human brain typically 
responds to stimulus. We know that when the human brain senses a threat, there 
is a sharp decline in the amount of resources available for “overall executive 
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functions in the prefrontal cortex,” (Rock, 2008) and that there is “a negative 
correlation between threat activation and resources for the prefrontal cortex” 
(Rock, 2008; Arsten,1998). This means less oxygen, and thus, less glucose 
available to fuel working memory, in turn impacting what Rock refers to as 
“linear, conscious processing” (2008).  
 
An organization overrun with threat-response stimulus will be made up of 
members whose pre-frontal cortex do not physically have the resources to 
problem-solve effectively. As the brain seeks the safety of the familiar, these 
conditions can play a significant role in strategic myopia, depriving the brain of 
the necessary nutrients to innovate. In leadership, when we talk about nurturing 
staff to do their best work, the organization has a responsibility to foster a culture 
that is neurologically healthy. This is especially true when engaging with the 
complex challenges that arise from uncertainty, as we do when we are working 
towards a preferred future.  
 
Further, and most relevant to nurturing future-facing organizational culture, when 
the brain is threatened, its heightened, over-activated state prevents its user from 
observing subtle cues and signals, which is a critical component of the strategic 
foresight process. Gathering cues about our environment and articulating subtle 
shifts in the human behavioural tides is a crucial component of good futuring. 
Foresight exposes us to the complexity of human systems, demanding abstraction 
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and non-linear thinking. In its threatened state the oxygen- and glucose deprived 
brain lacks the capacity to approach non-linear problems. This points directly to 
the Icarus paradox that particularly impacts leaders who are faced with crises, or 
are stuck in the myopic cycle of making decisions that keep shareholders happy in 
the short-term, while avoiding the complexity of long-term shifts in their 
environment. Creating a rewarding organizational culture that mitigates 
uncertainty and reduces the threat response is critical to stronger futures thinking.  
 
From an evolutionary standpoint, the brain is designed to prioritize safety, which 
means that it instinctively wants to prioritize familiar, more predictable paths. 
This is what we often refer to as our ‘comfort zone,’ a threshold for risk that is 
informed by our individual experiences. When we extend beyond that threshold, 
our amygdala is activated and becomes hypersensitive to stimuli. The brain is 
more likely to generalize, draw tenuous connections, and shrink from alternative 
opportunities in this hypersensitive state (Rock, 2008). Often, stimuli that would 
not ordinarily cause stress, become disproportionately stressful (Phelps, 2006). 
The threat response has a far more profound, faster onset, and longer-lasting 
impact on the limbic system than its reward counterpart (Beaumeister, 2001), 
making it far more harmful for our health and placing much more stress on our 
organizational culture. Rock uses this to explain why the evening news is much 
more focused on threatening stories, and why humans have such a propensity for 
self-criticism (2008).  
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Increasing Brain Rewards: The key to an organization that is extremely effective at 
mitigating uncertainty and considering the long view could lay in creating the 
conditions for more approach-state emotions. Significant research shows that 
those experiencing positive emotions see more connections and perceive more 
potential options in problem-solving scenarios (Frederickson, 2001). Research 
also reveals that reward responses lead to solving more non-linear problems in an 
insightful way (Jung-Beeman, 2007).  
 
Most importantly, an approach state is nearly synonymous with engagement, 
which is critical to a strong strategic foresight practice, especially as it relates to 
scanning the periphery. As renowned management consultant Peter Drucker 
commented when questioned about his highly accurate predictions, said “I don’t 
forecast. I look out the window and identify what’s visible but not yet seen.” 
(Butterfield, 2006) A highly mature foresight practice is constantly engaging with 
potential futures, and the culture of the organization must create the neurological 
conditions for an engaged membership to work towards a preferred vision of the 
future.  
 
FOUR   Diversity better prepares us for a range of possible futures 		
As previously explored, we can learn a lot about adapting to changing conditions 
from agricultural systems. Crops in a monoculture, which share genetic traits, are 
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more susceptible to succumbing to disease because their common DNA renders 
them more vulnerable.  Biodiversity is important because more genetic variance 
translates to more resistance to a particular disease. If one organism within the 
crop lacks the resistance, the whole crop will not necessarily go down with it. It is 
a system of checks and balances that allows for survival in a range of possible 
scenarios. Likewise, diversity in the workplace decreases the chance of being 
blindsided by shifts in the market.   
 
This research helped to validate the need for more diversity in organizational 
culture. Organizations with stronger foresight practices all cited diversity or 
inclusion as cultural dimensions, and conversely, those organizations with weak 
foresight practices strongly did not identify with these dimensions. Michael 
Merzenich beautifully articulates the adaptive quality of diversity: 
 
Our individual skills and abilities are very much shaped by our 
environments. And that environment extends into our 
contemporary culture, the thing our brains are challenged with 
because what we’ve done in our personal evolutions is build up a 
large repertoire of specific skills and abilities, that are specific to 
our own individual histories. And in fact they result in a wonderful 
differentiation in humankind in a way that in fact, no two of us are 
quite alike. Every one of us has a different set of acquired skills and 
abilities that all derive out of the plasticity - the adaptability of this 
remarkable adaptive machine [the human brain].” (2004)  
 
Obvious ethical arguments aside, diversity presents us with a wealth of skills and 
abilities that help to increase our adaptive capacity in the market. Further, it 
provides a diversity in thinking that can help us build more thorough, well-
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articulated visions of the future. As in crop diversity, diversity can help cast a 
wider net of signals and trends, expand our peripheral vision, and reveal more of 
nuances in our ideas of the future. This is not a particularly novel idea – multi-
disciplinarity has long been seen as a driver of innovation, helping us to forge new 
connections and approach problems from a variety of lenses. But the true 
challenge of diversity lies in cultivating the right conditions for all members to feel 
heard. Diversity is a trope in the organizational culture space, where affirmative 
action and diversity for diversity’s sake is a common practice, with which many 
leaders struggle to contend.  
 
From a brain science perspective, diversity means creating a neurologically 
rewarding organizational culture, where all members feel heard and their ideas are 
considered. It is the absence of threat-response provoking cultural conditions, 
where the individual experiences that inform our implicit attitudes are considered, 
and there is an intentional effort to leverage the knowledge and skills that 
individuals bring to the table.  
 
In this context, diversity is not for the organization to make an effort to hire more 
persons from protected classes per se.  Rather, we should see each individual as a 
purveyor of a unique perspective of the future, and see their experiences has 
contributing a perspective that we do not yet have. And rather than exploiting 
their neuroplasticity and indoctrinating individuals into the current organizational 
			
	
	
109 
dogma, organizations have the opportunity to broaden their own perspective by 
extension of each individual. Diversity only works when there is a deep, sincere, 
and persistent commitment to inclusion; there will always be a tendency for some 
voices to be louder than others, and diversity must extend beyond affirmative 
action mandates and human resources policy. True diversity is about leadership 
that is skilled at bringing out the best of its people.  
 
This means fostering a culture that does not indoctrinate new hires, but instead 
invites them to be constructively critical during the onboarding process. 
Maintaining a cultural mosaic means discouraging compliance and incentivizing 
members to challenge the status quo. How organizations do this will vary, but a 
deep understanding and sensitivity towards how the brain responds to social 
stimuli goes a long way in creating safe spaces for all members of an organization.  
 
 
 
FIVE  The shared vision of a preferred future acts is critical 		
If you want to build a ship, don't drum up the people to gather wood, divide the work, 
and give orders. Instead, teach them to yearn for the vast and endless sea. 
 
ANTOINE DE SAINT-EXUPERY  
 
 
Another critical principle for stimulating the conditions for futures thinking in 
organizations, and perhaps the most important, is that organizations need to have 
a strong stake in the future if they are going to survive to experience it. A strong 
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future-facing organizational culture is bound not only by a preferred future, but 
also by the spirit of agility. Their core purpose should not be to build the same 
product or provide the same service into oblivion. But rather, they should be joint 
by a shared enthusiasm for their redundancy. Part of the challenge is that the 
brain simply does not like change. It takes time to adjust to new realities, as our 
brains need to shift structurally and build new pathways. As we learned, 
neuroplasticity declines as we age, making it more challenging to accept change as 
we age. However, if we build businesses that are designed to change, then it will not 
be so frightening for individuals to accept expansion into a new domain, or a 
complete teardown of the organization’s core product.  
 
Leading with strategic foresight makes a preferred vision the company’s core 
offering, a beacon in the distance that guides them. It allows individuals to focus 
on the pursuit of a preferred future, one that has the potential to evolve with the 
needs of our society, rather than be emotionally tethered to a particular product or 
service offering. This naturally affords organizations the agility to let go of legacy 
ideas and convention, and shape-shift with the ebbs and flows of changing market 
tides. Organizations are simply a group of individuals working towards a common 
goal, and we need to foster organizational culture that encourages (and mandates) 
its members to gaze into the future.  
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SIX  To err is human - and crucial to building the cognitive toolkit for 
futuring 		
Mistakes are the brain’s predictive errors. It demonstrates that our brains expected 
one outcome, and reality played out in way that the brain did not predict. When 
we make mistakes, it is the result of our brains miscalculating or misjudging a 
particular scenario. Our brains mis-take the conditions. When a baby’s brain is 
developing, we do not watch them fumble with their first steps and say look at all 
the mistakes that baby is making; we afford them the space to practice over and over 
until they build the cognitive capacity to predict what happens when they put one 
foot in front of the other.  
 
A strong foresight practice is one wherein there are sincere opportunities to 
practice, and opportunities to err when the stakes are low. There are lots of 
cognitive barriers that prevent the human brain from considering the future. The 
discomfort of uncertainty, the cognitive safety of conformity, outdated mental 
models, the brain’s decline in neuroplasticity, and balancing the demands of one’s 
daily routine against a future that has not yet happened, creates the perfect 
conditions for strategic myopia and flawed futures thinking. Encouraging futures 
thinking in a low-risk context facilitates members of an organization to practice 
thinking about the future, where mistakes can be made in a way that is not 
neurologically threatening, but instead, provides rewarding learning experience 
and carves new neural pathways. This is a crucial component of nurturing 
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members of an organization that are continuously and subconsciously scanning for 
signals of change in their environment that nod to potential futures. 
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8.0  TOWARDS A MEASUREMENT TOOL FOR FUTURE-
FACING ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE  	
 
My interest is in the future because I am going to spend the rest of my life there.  	
CHARLES KETTERING 	
 
 
This research revealed some best practices that organizations can leverage to 
stimulate a culture that is well suited to foresight and foster the neurological 
conditions that are necessary for considerations of the long view. The hope is that 
these cultural practices can help to mitigate uncertainty and reduce some of the 
myopia that we see in many organizations struggle to contend with disruption. 
Leveraging our learnings about neuroplasticity, diversity, implicit attitudes, and 
the ideal neurological conditions for futures thinking, we can expand the 
Foresight Maturity Model (FMM) to build a more complete picture of future-
facing culture. This iteration of the FMM includes the original disciplines of 
Leadership, Framing, Planning, Scanning, Forecasting, and Visioning, and has been 
expanded to include two new sections: Climate & Communication and Culture. 
The Leadership discipline underwent the most reconfiguration, with the shift of 
some core practices and the addition of several others. Framing, Scanning and 
Visioning all expanded to include one new practice in each. Included in Appendix 
A is the foresight maturity model distributed to participants for reference.  
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The expansion of the FMM reflects some of the more tacit, implicit attitudes that 
emerged throughout the research. For example, the Leadership discipline (see 
Figure 27 on the following page) was expanded to include a focus on futures 
literacy and ongoing low-risk learning opportunities. It was also expanded to 
capture shifting time perspectives cognitive bias, as well as to mandate diversity in 
the futuring process. 
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Figure 27: Expanded Leadership Discipline in the FMM 
 
 
Culture also became its own discipline in this expanded version of the FMM (see 
Figure 28, on page 117). Within this discipline are practices that encourage a 
more neurologically-rewarding culture, reducing threat stimulus where possible to 
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free up the cognitive faculties for processing uncertainty. A commitment to 
Kaizen is also a core practice, encouraging continuous incremental improvement 
and ongoing monitoring of the complex system that is organizational culture. 
This discipline also articulates futures thinking as a heuristic to help members 
mitigate uncertainty and develop foresight as a temporal wayfinding mechanism 
through which they navigate their relationship to the world.  
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Figure 28: Newly formed Culture discipline in the FMM 
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The addition of organizational cognitive neuroscience insights helps to bolster our 
understanding of the ways in which organizations engage with futures thinking, 
and some of the barriers that prevent them from considering the long view. 
Though a work in progress, this addition to the FMM stimulates an important 
conversation that needs to be had about competing mental models in strategic 
environments and the cognitive nuances of futuring.  
 
For the fully expanded Foresight Maturity Model, please see Appendix E. 
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9.0   APPLICATIONS OF THIS WORK 	
 
During the participant recruitment phase of this project, it was clear that 
organizations are uncomfortable talking about their culture. When the project 
began, the goal was to engage organizations themselves in the research, a strategy 
that did not ultimately fit the research goals. In speaking with organizations about 
their culture, the overarching theme was that the leadership was aware that 
something needed to change, that there were aspects of the culture that were highly 
stagnant, bureaucratic, or simply stuck, but that the roadmap to improving culture 
was lacking. This is largely because there is no such thing as ‘good’ culture or ‘bad’ 
culture, when it comes to innovation. The reality is that culture simply is, and 
improving culture is really a process of building stronger relationships, which 
requires intuition, sensitivity, and ongoing reflection of the human experience. 
These are intimidating qualities to throw around in the business world, which 
prides itself on a kind of corporate rigour driven by data, process, and mitigating 
risk. Nuance is not something the business world does particularly well, and 
organizational culture is defined by nuance. Technological disruption did, 
however, give rise to the necessity for organizational introspection, and many 
companies are recognizing the need to critically examine their culture. As such, 
they are often interested in the output of the research, but are adverse to reveal 
their vulnerabilities by participating in the research themselves.  
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Giving rise to the million-dollar question: how might we apply the findings in 
this work? The simple answer is, each organization will need to establish its own 
interventions. Every organization is a unique system with its own institutional 
dynamics, filled with individuals with their own sets of experiences that yield 
unique implicit and explicit attitudes. This is what makes organizational culture so 
complex and wicked.  
 
Having said that, the only real way to process and make sense of an organization’s 
culture is to establish a strong system of self-reporting implicit attitudes. Because 
our implicit attitudes are so reflexive, we are often not immediately aware of them. 
A strong future-facing organizational culture begins at the individual level, with a 
foundation of self-awareness around our implicit and explicit attitudes. One way 
of doing this would be to build software that encourages members of an 
organization to self-report their interactions, and develop an authentic, 
meaningful understanding of how our wayfinding systems are built. 
Understanding how our experiences inform the way in which we approach 
problems can go a long way towards building an organization-wide taxonomy of 
the implicit and explicit attitudes informing our strategic decision-making 
processes.  
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Armed with data about implicit and explicit attitudes on an individual level, 
organizations can begin to identify patterns across project teams, departments, 
and levels of leadership. Analyzing the data across the organization can help to 
establish key points of intervention where members might be subject to harsh 
neurological conditions that hinder problem-solving capacity, empathy, 
collaboration, and innovative thinking.  
 
Organizations can then focus on a roadmap for a culture that is more future-
facing. The FMM offers core best practices and improving culture by offering a 
roadmap to help organizations to level up.  
 
Future-facing organizational culture is not about achieving specific, measurable 
objectives. It is more about empowering individuals to consider the long view, on 
an individual level, on the organizational level, and in a societal sense. It is based 
on the premise that the human brain has a finite amount of cognitive resources, 
and when an organization’s culture is rife with threats, the brain lacks the resources 
to thrive in times of uncertainty. Building strong organizational culture is about 
properly allocating the brain’s resources, and not squandering them on 
unnecessary neurological threats. To do so, organizations must be incredibly 
sensitive to the cultural conditions we foster.  
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10.0   CONCLUSION 	
 
Neuroscience shows brain activity precedes behaviour; that is to say, the brain 
shows activity before we demonstrate a conscious decision to act. In a study by 
neuroscientist John Dylan Haynes, participants were asked to press one of two 
buttons, and the fMRI revealed activity in the prefrontal cortex (the part of the 
brain responsible for thought and consciousness) a full 7 to 10 seconds before they 
were consciously aware of their own selection (Soon et. al., 2008). This is why 
organizational culture is so important; we need to create the optimal conditions for 
futures-thinking to take place. It is about far more than simply changing 
behaviour; in fact, behaviour is simply a symptom of cognitive processing. 
Behaviour helps to reveal cognitive patterns, but culture is informed by our 
unconscious reasoning, our implicit attitudes towards the world. A more robust 
understanding of organizational culture is one that reflects upon the cognitive 
processes that happen a full 7 to 10 seconds before it manifests as behaviour.  
 
Much akin to the first law of thermodynamics, organizational culture cannot be 
created nor destroyed, it can simply change its form. Because of the exponential 
shifts across all sectors, the business world is on the pursuit for an almost 
mythical, utopian organizational culture. But an organization’s culture simply just 
is; they are dynamics that emerge among a group of brains in a particular context. 
The wickedness of organizational culture emerges from the idea that it can never 
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be fully ‘solved,’ there is no optimal culture. We do know, however, that there are 
more neurologically optimal conditions for mitigating uncertainty and 
productively considering the future. Using that knowledge and building strategic 
practices that respect the architecture of the human brain is a critical part of 
integrating foresight into organizational culture and practicing responsible futures. 
 
Moving forward, this research suggests that we need a new way of defining 
organizational culture, particularly as it relates to adopting more future-facing 
perspectives. This work proposes the following definition of organizational 
culture:  
A living system, made up of individuals with respective temporal wayfinding systems, 
all working towards a shared vision of their preferred future. 
 
The hope that others in the academic and business communities will contribute to 
this definition and that it will evolve over time. Through publication of this work 
via academic journals and online think-pieces, as well as presenting this material 
to various businesses and conference audiences, the hope is that we can shift the 
way we assess organizational culture and foster the neurological conditions that 
empower individuals to consider the long view.  All organizational culture is 
inherently future-facing in that the future is inevitable, but working towards 
responsible preferred futures with intention is perhaps the most important thing 
the business community will do at this junction of human history.  
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 10.1	 Further	Research 	
The contributions of this work include: a critique of existing organizational 
culture assessment tools; an exploration of the human factors that may impede 
considerations of the future; an expanded Foresight Maturity Model to include 
more cultural considerations; mapping of cultural dimensions to SCARF 
principles; and an alternative definition of organizational culture that reflects 
mental time travel.   
 
There are many possibilities to continue this research within the disciplines of 
organizational neuroscience, neuroleadership, and the neuroscience of culture, as 
well as psychology and sociology. Perhaps the most poignant opportunity would 
be to use fMRI technology to observe which parts of the brain are activated when 
participants are questioned about their attitudes towards the future. If we could 
build a map of brain as it engages with the future, we could better understand how 
we process our thoughts about the future and explore the cognitive barriers and 
opportunities in fostering cultural conditions for foresight. This would not only 
expand on the work of Rock and his peers, but could also introduce the 
neuroscience of futures thinking that would have significant implications on the 
practice of strategic foresight, sustainability, and psychology. This kind of work 
would advance our thinking about our own personal futures, as well as expand 
that thinking to community, organizations, and society.  
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Another fascinating topic of research would be to establish whether some people 
experience uncertainty differently than others, neurologically speaking. For 
example, if we scanned the brains of the some of the world’s most future-facing 
leaders, or those of futurists who tour the world lecturing on creating more 
resilient futures, would their limbic systems show more subtle threat-response 
reactions than the average person? It would be interesting to explore whether 
there is any evidence that some brains are more oriented towards future-thinking 
than others.  
 
Another avenue would be to deepen the study of future-facing organizational 
culture, with a larger sample, and gathering more over time. This dimension is a 
crucial one, as culture shifts greatly over time, and could reveal more context-
specific triggers (acquisitions, changes in the market, the loss of a key leadership 
figure) that could prove important to the organization’s culture. A cultural tool 
that can capture subtle shifts in an organization’s culture is an invaluable next step 
for this research, as none of the current instruments adequately captures this data. 
The challenge here is going beyond the explicit attitudes, and building a more 
profound, authentic understand of the implicit attitudes underpinning them.  
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Clear ownership and active mandates to implement and institutionalize foresight capability
LEADERSHIP
Engage people in 
conscious and 
thoughtful actions to 
proactively create the 
future they have 
chosen. 
Foresight activities are 
rarely held, and result in 
only a coincidental 
relationship to planning 
activities and resulting 
execution
Foresight projects are 
on the annual calendar 
for an organization. The 
process and the results 
trickle through the 
organization and 
unevenly become part 
of the future of the 
organization.
Foresight activities are 
regularly on the agenda 
for all levels of 
management. The 
results of these 
activities play an 
important role in 
deciding and executing 
the future agreed upon 
for the organization.
Foresight activities and 
discussions of the 
future are a considered 
part of planning 
activities of the 
organization. The 
organization eﬀectively 
and consistently  
executes to deliver the 
plan for the future.
The organization is 
recognized by peers as 
being able to envision a 
vibrant future and then 
eﬀectively enlist all its 
members to engage and 
live their collective 
vision.
LEVEL 1
Ad-Hoc
LEVEL 2
Aware
LEVEL 3
Capable
LEVEL 4
Competent
LEVEL 5
World-Class
Create an environ-
ment that provides 
timely anticipation of 
change embracing 
positive changes and 
responding creatively 
to negative changes.
Changes tend to be 
surprises, and 
responses are reactive 
based on superficial 
analysis and without a 
full understanding of 
the implications.
The organization has 
created an informal 
structure that 
anticipates major 
changes and can 
quickly put together 
response plans.
The organization has 
developed  diﬀerent 
scenarios of the future 
and uses these to 
anticipate and respond 
eﬀectively to changes 
as they arise.
A systematic approach 
to monitoring ongoing 
changes, combined 
with well thought-out 
plans and implications, 
allow the organization 
to provide timely and 
successful responses to 
their environment.
The organization not 
only has very successful 
processes to monitor 
and respond to 
environmental changes 
but is out in front 
enough to influence the 
changes in the direction 
that is beneficial.
Clearly comunicate 
the goals, results, and 
implications of 
foresight activities
There are implicit and 
often undocumented 
goals and plans from 
foresight activities. The 
senior leaders may or 
may not be aware of the 
general direction and 
implications of this 
eﬀort.
Goals and results from 
foresight activity are 
usually documented 
but are primarily 
communicated to 
managers and key 
people in the 
organization.
Goals and plans from 
foresight activity are 
conveyed to the 
organization. Everyone 
is aware of the 
implications and aligns 
work and responsibili-
ties appropriately.
Everyone in the 
organization considers 
and uses the goals and 
plans from foresight 
work to inform their 
decisions and perform 
their daily activity
In addition to informing 
day-to-day decisions 
with implications from 
foresight activity, all 
organizational members 
become part of the 
immediate feedback 
loop that refines and 
adjusts the goals and 
results
Create an 
environment and 
processes that drive 
foresight knowledge 
into action. 
The organization 
responds in an ad hoc 
manner to any foresight 
knowledge. Activities 
are undertaken without 
a clear sense of how it 
will be acted upon.
There is an informal 
process to include 
foresight information in 
formal plans. 
Organizational leaders 
may or may not be  
aware of it. If the 
situation allows, they 
try to include it.
Formal processes exist 
to make sure that 
knowledge gained 
during foresight 
activities is moved into 
the strategic and 
operational activities of 
the organization.
Systematic processes 
exist to drive foresight 
knowledge and 
implications into all 
existing organizational 
processes in a  timely 
and non-disruptive 
manner.
Foresight knowledge is 
a basic pillar for all 
organizational activity. 
There is a tight 
feedback loop that 
provides additional 
insight from operational 
results back through to 
the foresight process.
Recognize the cultural 
artifacts and mental 
models operating in 
the organization and 
how they influence 
organizational 
decisions.
Members of the 
organization are not 
specifically aware of 
their culture and its 
impact on their 
operational processes.
There is recognition of 
the cultural diﬀerences 
and heritage of the 
organization. It uses this 
information to 
implement major policy 
changes.
Members of the 
organization have 
considerable 
understanding of how 
their culture works and 
use this knowledge 
explicitly in building 
eﬀective strategic and 
operational plans and 
policies.
Members of the 
organization have a 
thorough understanding 
of their culture and 
have done a compre-
hensive analysis of how 
this interacts with 
strategic and 
operational aspects of 
the business.
The deep understand-
ing of cultural elements 
creates a dynamic 
ethos that crafts new 
traditions and stories to 
continually evolve with 
change.
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Establishing the boundaries and scope of the endeavor
FRAMING
Identify the root 
questions and true 
issues driving the 
project request, 
reconciling with those 
that have been 
explicitly stated.
Project work is taken at 
face value and 
addresses the stated 
request.
Discussion on 
requirements and 
issues takes place with 
project sponsors to 
clarify and further 
communicate project 
goals.
Prior to a the start of a 
project, detailed 
requirements and 
fundamental 
assumptions are 
documented, reviewed, 
and agreed upon by all 
parties.
A systematic process is 
in place prior to 
initiating work to 
understand, validate, 
and document the 
underlying base 
objectives, goals, and 
assumptions of the 
project.
A process is in place to 
eﬃciently highlight base 
issues and require-
ments, yielding a 
project that achieves 
goals which the 
sponsors did not 
initially know how to 
articulate but now 
recognize as addressing 
their real questions.
Set measurable and 
documented 
objectives which have 
the agreement of 
stakeholders.
Track progress toward 
the objectives and 
reframe root problems 
and issues against 
progress and changes 
external to the 
endeavor.
Goals of the project are 
basically to complete 
the work and to satisfy 
customer requests.
Basic goals and 
objectives are not 
significantly changed 
from their inception 
regardless of external or 
internal changes.
Project sponsors 
discuss their priorities 
and expectations for 
project completion.
Progress is sporadically 
monitored to see if it is 
on course. If major 
events occur or core 
issues are found to be 
wrong, adjustments are 
made.
Participants agree to 
and document a set of 
defined and prioritized 
goals and objectives for 
the project.
Periodic reviews of 
progress are consistent-
ly held. There is a 
change process in place 
to adjust plans and 
reframe goals based on 
new information.
A well-established 
process is in place, 
using best practices to 
create and build 
consensus for 
meaningful and 
objective outcomes.
Insightful organizational 
processes ensure that 
the project is flexible 
and on target to 
address any course 
corrections and meet 
real end-date needs of 
sponsors.
The organization is 
well-known for its 
ability to arrive at 
insightful measure-
ments that clearly 
illuminate and calibrate 
prioritized outcomes.
Plans are seamlessly 
attuned to changes, 
dynamically adjusting 
to provide resources for 
eﬃcient and timely 
proactive responses.
LEVEL 1
Ad-Hoc
LEVEL 2
Aware
LEVEL 3
Capable
LEVEL 4
Competent
LEVEL 5
World-Class
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Ensuring that the plans, people, skills, and processes support the organizational vision
PLANNING
Identify the 
implications and 
consequences of 
alternative futures 
and actions.
Explore a variety of 
potential strategies 
and options
Choose and refine a 
strategy that 
optimizes progress 
toward the 
organizational vision.
Develop a plan to 
address the activities, 
processes, talent, and 
communications 
required to achieve 
the strategy.
Alternative futures are 
rarely considered—the 
expectation is that the 
future will be a 
continuation of today.
The organization has a 
de facto strategy that 
may be inferred from 
the actions and 
investments that it 
makes.  
The organization 
expects that the normal 
course of events and 
smart daily operational 
decisions will achieve 
their vision.
There are no formal 
project plans. Actions 
and decisions are made 
as needed and 
communication 
generally occurs when 
someone thinks to do 
so.
Alternative futures are 
occasionally 
considered, and these 
generally follow major 
trends identified and 
highlighted by the 
media.
A variety of strategies 
are considered quickly 
without any real 
exploration of their 
implications.
On a periodic basis, 
such as yearly, the 
organization reviews 
and adjusts its strategy 
to make sure it is on 
plan to meet the stated 
vision.
High-level planning 
matches skills and 
needs with periodic 
assessment of missing 
skills. Communication 
can occur frequently 
but generally does so in 
an unstructured format.
Organization regularly 
looks at diﬀerent 
possible futures and 
uses the documented 
implications and 
consequences of these 
exercises to determine 
their plans.
The organization has a 
best-practice process 
for evaluating potential 
strategies and uses 
clear criteria for 
deciding which strategy 
best meets its needs.
There is a process in 
place to continually 
review and evaluate 
trendy or novel 
occurrences happening 
in the fringes of society.
Formal plans and 
processes are in place 
for most or all areas of 
the organization to 
eﬃciently engage and 
manage employees, 
including 
communication 
structure.
Organization has 
processes in place to 
review environmental 
indicators and develop 
a range of possible 
futures. For each of 
these, a thoughtful and 
thorough analysis is 
developed.
A systematic process is 
used to routinely 
re-evaluate strategies 
as new information and 
feedback are available. 
Strategy is often tested 
before implementation.
Strategic alternatives 
are frequently evaluated 
via well-maintained 
quantitative models. 
Adjustments are made 
which optimize 
strategic decisions.
Organizational 
structures and 
procedures have been 
redefined to eliminate 
bureaucracy and 
ineﬃciency. Detailed 
plans and processes are 
an inherent part of 
every employee’s 
vocabulary. 
Organization has 
developed its own 
process and framework 
for eﬃciently and 
accurately reviewing 
downstream 
implications of a wide 
range of possible 
futures.
Members of the 
organization are 
recognized by their 
industry peers for their 
continual creative and  
breakthrough 
strategies.
Strategic decisions are 
continuously refined 
based on real time data 
captured in a highly 
integrated intelligence 
system.
Innovative new 
structures and policies 
have been created that 
engage the ability of the  
“learning”  organization  
to grow and adapt as it 
smoothly executes  well 
thought-out plans.
LEVEL 1
Ad-Hoc
LEVEL 2
Aware
LEVEL 3
Capable
LEVEL 4
Competent
LEVEL 5
World-Class
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Collection of appropriate and relevant information in a format and timeframe that support useful retrieval.
SCANNING
Map the domain of the 
system into a 
framework of areas to 
explore
Collect pertinent 
information from a 
range of diﬀuse and 
credible sources
Identify outliers or 
“outside-the-system” 
signals of impending 
changes that could 
impact the system
Integrate external and 
internal information 
into a common 
framework and 
language
Create a useful and 
accessible 
information repository
The domain map is 
created from those 
areas directly and 
explicitly connected to 
the area of interest.
Information is gathered 
from easily accessible 
resources commonly 
used by the project, and 
collected only as 
needed. 
The media are the 
primary source 
for any signals of 
change.
Scanned information 
points are taken as is, 
with minimal eﬀort 
to understand and 
integrate them.
Scanned data is stored 
in an unstructured and 
ad hoc manner. 
Retrieval is generally by 
the person who 
collected 
the information.
In addition to the 
directly connected 
areas, the domain map 
is augmented with 
other areas 
“called-out" by the 
information collected.
Information is collected 
from traditional 
resources as well as 
some novel sources. 
Eﬀort is made, when 
time allows, to do 
general scanning.
High-impact and 
low-probability events 
are considered in 
addition to media 
spotlights when looking 
for potential surprises.
Linkages are informally 
made and generally 
within a category, 
providing a variable 
view of information.
An informal process is 
in place to collect, tag, 
and store information. 
Information can be 
retrieved but may take 
some time.
A recognized framework 
(such as STEEP) is used 
to create a complete 
domain map, 
supporting evaluation 
of many diﬀerent facets 
of the system.
Information is collected 
routinely from varied 
sources ranging from 
the traditional to 
alternative. Analysts 
consider information 
from other domains 
that could provide 
insight.
There is a process in 
place to continually 
review and evaluate 
trendy or novel 
occurrences happening 
in the fringes of society.
Connections are made 
between diﬀerent 
categories providing a 
comprehensive and 
cohesive view of 
scanned information.
Information is tagged 
and stored in an 
organization-wide 
repository providing 
easy access to retrieve 
information of interest.
Organizational 
processes exist to 
define and build a 
comprehensive domain 
map, exploring domains 
such as second-order 
impacts.
 A systematic process 
collects information 
from a wide range¬ of 
resources and media 
formats on a consistent 
cycle providing for a 
comprehensive view of 
the topic.
Best practices such 
as ethnographic 
journeys or wild cards, 
are part of the 
organization’s culture to 
consistently 
identify outliers.
Universal models 
provide a powerful 
world-view framework 
for deep understanding 
and  an integrated 
picture of the 
information collected.
A high-tech repository 
with an intuitive 
structure helps 
facilitate insight and 
organize thoughts as 
information is retrieved.
An anticipatory domain 
map adjusts dynamical-
ly to changes to provide 
insightful observations 
from underlying 
streams.
Sophisticated 
methodology and tools 
provide timely and 
continuous collection of 
information, allowing 
for visibility on many 
dimensions with unique 
views of the topic.
The organization has 
created unique 
practices in the industry 
to highlight potential 
changes including those 
not related directly to 
the topic.
New, innovative, and 
dynamic models 
created by the 
organization bring 
context and insight to 
diﬀuse and wide-rang-
ing data points.
Organization provides 
leadership in 
state-of-the-art content 
storage and retrieval, 
pushing out information 
in anticipation of need.
LEVEL 1
Ad-Hoc
LEVEL 2
Aware
LEVEL 3
Capable
LEVEL 4
Competent
LEVEL 5
World-Class
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Acquire insight into 
emerging ideas or 
themes with the 
aggregation of 
information into 
categorized clusters.
Consider the widest 
possible set of 
plausible alternative 
futures in evaluating 
choices or decisions 
aﬀecting the system.
Distill and detail 
plausible alternative 
futures into the 
working set for 
consideration.
Information is organized 
based on identifiable 
surface information.
Alternative futures are 
generally in the comfort 
zone of the probable, 
and are variations on 
the expected future for 
the domain of interest.
Alternative forecasts are 
primarily used "as is" 
from the information 
collected.
Information is collected 
and organized in a 
manner which supports 
the generation of ideas 
of interest.
Alternative futures are 
established from the 
domain of interest and 
directly related areas 
and provide for a range 
of possibilities.
Alternative forecasts are 
reviewed and a subset 
is selected.  Additional 
information is 
documented to support 
the selected alterna-
tives and present a 
more understandable 
view.
Information is organized 
such that useful ideas 
and themes clearly 
emerge.
Plausible alternative 
futures are drawn from 
analysis of all 
contextual categories to 
understand broader 
possibilities for the 
domain of interest.
A manageable set of 
alternative futures 
covering the full range 
of topics is produced. 
Each alternative 
contains significant  
detail, supporting the 
key implications.
Organizational 
processes for 
aggregating information 
are based on 
established models, 
providing additional 
perspective and 
comprehensive framing 
for themes and ideas. 
Exploration of most of 
the plausible options is 
an integral part of 
developing alternative 
futures and provides 
complete coverage of 
the domain of interest.
A systematic process is 
in place to produce a 
set of alternative 
futures. Each alternative 
is presented in a clear 
and comprehensive way
The organization is 
recognized for creating 
a framework which sets 
the standard for 
illuminating underlying 
discoveries in the 
information collected.
The set of alternative 
futures covers the 
highly probable to the 
extremes of what’s 
plausible, providing  
comprehensive 
coverage of the system.
An optimal set of 
alternative futures is 
generated. Each 
alternative makes 
critical elements 
immediately apparent 
and the accompanying 
depth provides 
unchallengeable 
support.
LEVEL 1
Ad-Hoc
LEVEL 2
Aware
LEVEL 3
Capable
LEVEL 4
Competent
LEVEL 5
World-Class
Collection of appropriate and relevant information in a format and timeframe that support useful retrieval.
FORECASTING
Validate foresight to 
create an integrated 
set of credible and 
coherent alternative 
futures.
The set of distilled and 
detailed alternative 
futures is used "as is."
Follow-up research is 
done on a fact-checking 
basis.
Alternative futures are 
checked and revised so 
that they tell a coherent 
story. 
Preliminary implications 
are identified to test the 
alternative futures for 
relevance.
The set of alternative 
futures is reviewed and 
revised to ensure that a 
balanced set of 
view-points and 
perspectives is 
represented.  
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Ensuring that the plans, people, skills, and processes support the organizational vision
PLANNING
Identify the 
implications and 
consequences of 
alternative futures 
and actions.
Explore a variety of 
potential strategies 
and options
Choose and refine a 
strategy that 
optimizes progress 
toward the 
organizational vision.
Develop a plan to 
address the activities, 
processes, talent, and 
communications 
required to achieve 
the strategy.
Alternative futures are 
rarely considered—the 
expectation is that the 
future will be a 
continuation of today.
The organization has a 
de facto strategy that 
may be inferred from 
the actions and 
investments that it 
makes.  
The organization 
expects that the normal 
course of events and 
smart daily operational 
decisions will achieve 
their vision.
There are no formal 
project plans. Actions 
and decisions are made 
as needed and 
communication 
generally occurs when 
someone thinks to do 
so.
Alternative futures are 
occasionally 
considered, and these 
generally follow major 
trends identified and 
highlighted by the 
media.
A variety of strategies 
are considered quickly 
without any real 
exploration of their 
implications.
On a periodic basis, 
such as yearly, the 
organization reviews 
and adjusts its strategy 
to make sure it is on 
plan to meet the stated 
vision.
High-level planning 
matches skills and 
needs with periodic 
assessment of missing 
skills. Communication 
can occur frequently 
but generally does so in 
an unstructured format.
Organization regularly 
looks at diﬀerent 
possible futures and 
uses the documented 
implications and 
consequences of these 
exercises to determine 
their plans.
The organization has a 
best-practice process 
for evaluating potential 
strategies and uses 
clear criteria for 
deciding which strategy 
best meets its needs.
There is a process in 
place to continually 
review and evaluate 
trendy or novel 
occurrences happening 
in the fringes of society.
Formal plans and 
processes are in place 
for most or all areas of 
the organization to 
eﬃciently engage and 
manage employees, 
including 
communication 
structure.
Organization has 
processes in place to 
review environmental 
indicators and develop 
a range of possible 
futures. For each of 
these, a thoughtful and 
thorough analysis is 
developed.
A systematic process is 
used to routinely 
re-evaluate strategies 
as new information and 
feedback are available. 
Strategy is often tested 
before implementation.
Strategic alternatives 
are frequently evaluated 
via well-maintained 
quantitative models. 
Adjustments are made 
which optimize 
strategic decisions.
Organizational 
structures and 
procedures have been 
redefined to eliminate 
bureaucracy and 
ineﬃciency. Detailed 
plans and processes are 
an inherent part of 
every employee’s 
vocabulary. 
Organization has 
developed its own 
process and framework 
for eﬃciently and 
accurately reviewing 
downstream 
implications of a wide 
range of possible 
futures.
Members of the 
organization are 
recognized by their 
industry peers for their 
continual creative and  
breakthrough 
strategies.
Strategic decisions are 
continuously refined 
based on real time data 
captured in a highly 
integrated intelligence 
system.
Innovative new 
structures and policies 
have been created that 
engage the ability of the  
“learning”  organization  
to grow and adapt as it 
smoothly executes  well 
thought-out plans.
LEVEL 1
Ad-Hoc
LEVEL 2
Aware
LEVEL 3
Capable
LEVEL 4
Competent
LEVEL 5
World-Class
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How an organization's ideas are communicated, and how the appropriate actions are triggered.
CLIMATE & COMMUNICATION
Willingness to share 
across functions.
Poor: information is 
ignored and hoarded.
Exchange of information 
is rare and happens 
only in predefined 
formal channels. 
Exchange of information 
occurs on various levels 
but mostly in formalized 
channels. 
Excellent: ongoing 
information sharing on 
many levels.
Other organizations 
learn best practices 
from them in how to 
share information (are 
invited to speak on the 
topic, have published 
material that is oft 
cited, etc)
Informal 
communication
Poor: no informal 
communication.
Limited informal 
information across 
functions. 
Informal 
communication is 
encouraged, part of 
casual conversation.  
Future insights are 
diﬀused eﬀectively and 
often reach the relevant 
decision-makers 
through informal 
communication.  
Members regularly refer 
to the preferred vision 
of the future
Informal communica-
tion is a core value and 
organization has a 
system to evaluates its 
communication 
regularly. Members 
regularly refer to the 
preferred vision of the 
future with external 
stakeholders. 
LEVEL 1
Ad-Hoc
LEVEL 2
Aware
LEVEL 3
Capable
LEVEL 4
Competent
LEVEL 5
World-Class
Willingness to test 
and challenge basic 
assumptions.
The basic assumptions 
are neither known nor 
made transparent. 
Some basic 
assumptions are known 
but not challenged.
There is a good 
understanding of basic 
assumptions and they 
are tested.
Basic assumptions are 
explicit, much talked 
about, and frequently 
challenged. 
Others look to this 
organization to learn 
best practices. 
Challenging 
assumptions is part of 
the organization's fibre.
Readiness to listen to 
scouts
The organization is very 
closed. Contact with 
the outside is 
discouraged. 
Some external personal 
contacts are called 
upon, but gathered 
insights are disguised as 
coming from the inside. 
Personal contacts are 
regarded as valuable. 
Few have a variety of 
external contacts. 
The organization is very 
open. Building and 
maintaining an external 
network is encouraged. 
Organization has a 
mandate to build and 
maintain external 
network and provide 
resources to do so. 
Characteristics of 
foresighters
Strategists lack deep 
knowledge of their 
domain.
Foresighters have deep 
knowledge in their 
domain. 
Foresighters have both 
deep and broad 
knowledge. 
Foresighters have deep 
and broad knowledge 
and are selected for 
being curious and 
open-minded. 
Foresighters have a 
strong internal and 
external network and 
deep and broad 
knowledge and are 
passionate, curious, 
and open-minded.  
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Stimulating and sustaining the conditions for consideration of the long view
PEOPLE & NETWORKS
LEVEL 1
Ad-Hoc
LEVEL 2
Aware
LEVEL 3
Capable
LEVEL 4
Competent
LEVEL 5
World-Class
Characteristics of 
foresighters
Strategists lack deep 
knowledge of their 
domain.
Foresighters have deep 
knowledge in their 
domain. 
Foresighters have both 
deep and broad 
knowledge. 
Foresighters have deep 
and broad knowledge 
and are selected for 
being curious and 
open-minded. 
Foresighters have a 
strong internal and 
external network and 
deep and broad 
knowledge and are 
passionate, curious, 
and open-minded. 
Internal network No formal and informal 
contacts in other 
units - teams are very 
siloed.
Some of the team have 
formal and informal 
contacts in other units.
Cross-functional formal 
contacts are 
encouraged.
Cross-functional formal 
and informal contacts 
are encouraged.
Building and 
maintaining a web of 
internal partners is not 
only encouraged, it is 
perceived as important 
for every employee.
External network No formal or informal 
external contacts - 
organization is isolated.
Some of their team have 
formal and informal 
external contacts.
Formal contacts are 
encouraged and in 
addition, informal 
contacts are maintained 
by some employees.
Formal and informal 
external contacts are 
encouraged.
Building and maintain-
ing a web of external 
partners is not only 
encouraged, it is 
perceived as important 
for every employee.
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APPENDIX B: CULTURAL DIMENSIONS LIKERT SCALE, 
DISTRIBUTED TO RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS 
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APPENDIX C: BREAKDOWN OF CULTURAL DIMENSIONS INTO 
SCARF PRINCIPLES 														
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APPENDIX D: THREAT- AND REWARD-REWARD RESPONSE 
LEVELS, CATEGORIZED BY SCARF PRINCIPLES 																																			 						
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APPENDIX E: FULL EXPANSION OF THE FORESIGHT MATURITY 
MODEL 			
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Clear ownership and active mandates to implement and institutionalize foresight capability
LEADERSHIP
Engage people in 
conscious and 
thoughtful actions to 
proactively create the 
future they have 
chosen. 
Foresight activities are 
rarely held, and result in 
only a coincidental 
relationship to planning 
activities and resulting 
execution
Foresight projects are 
on the annual calendar 
for an organization. The 
process and the results 
trickle through the 
organization and 
unevenly become part 
of the future of the 
organization.
Foresight activities are 
regularly on the agenda 
for all levels of 
management. The 
results of these 
activities play an 
important role in 
deciding and executing 
the future agreed upon 
for the organization.
Foresight activities and 
discussions of the 
future are a considered 
part of planning 
activities of the 
organization. The 
organization eﬀectively 
and consistently  
executes to deliver the 
plan for the future.
The organization is 
recognized by peers as 
being able to envision a 
vibrant future and then 
eﬀectively enlist all its 
members to engage and 
live their collective 
vision.
Actively challenge 
time perspectives, 
engage critically with 
strategic planning 
process and ‘zoom in 
and out’ to challenge 
cognitive bias. 
Little critical thinking 
about strategic 
planning. Leadership 
does not reflect on bias 
that may be impacting 
decision-making.
There is recognition of 
the cultural diﬀerences 
and heritage of the 
organization. It uses this 
information to 
implement major policy 
changes.
All members of the 
strategic team have 
access to foresight 
practice, only within the 
context of imminent 
strategic initiatives.
All members of the 
strategic team engage 
in futures thinking 
within the context of 
imminent strategic 
initiatives. They are 
sometimes engaged in 
foresight outside of 
strategic initiatives. 
Leadership is 
perceptive and 
self-critical. Ongoing 
commitment to 
challenge bias. Leaders 
regularly argue from 
first principles and 
zoom in and out to gain 
perspective throughout 
strategic activities, 
embedding foresight 
throughout 
LEVEL 1
Ad-Hoc
LEVEL 2
Aware
LEVEL 3
Capable
LEVEL 4
Competent
LEVEL 5
World-Class
Empower members to  
embrace positive 
changes, anticipate 
change in a timely 
fashion, and respond 
creatively to negative 
shifts
Changes tend to be 
surprises, and 
responses are reactive 
based on superficial 
analysis and without a 
full understanding of 
the implications.
The organization has 
created an informal 
structure that 
anticipates major 
changes and can 
quickly put together 
response plans.
The organization has 
developed  diﬀerent 
scenarios of the future 
and uses these to 
anticipate and respond 
eﬀectively to changes 
as they arise.
A systematic approach 
to monitoring ongoing 
changes, combined 
with well thought-out 
plans and implications, 
allow the organization 
to provide timely and 
successful responses to 
their environment.
The organization not 
only has very successful 
processes to monitor 
and respond to 
environmental changes 
but is out in front 
enough to influence the 
changes in the direction 
that is beneficial.
Commit to diversity, 
with mechanisms to 
capture contributions 
from all members of 
the organization.
Leadership is insular, 
makes unilateral 
decisions with little to 
no engagement with 
other members in the 
organization. 
Superficial committ-
ment to diversity. 
Members are not 
overtly called upon and 
there are few 
opportunities for 
members outside of 
leadership to engage in 
foresight activities. 
Leadership is actively 
working towards more 
diversity, and 
occasionally calls upon 
members to contribute 
their opinions. 
Foresight practice is 
diverse, shaped by 
many diﬀerent voices at 
the organization. 
Highly diverse staﬀ, who 
are regularly called 
upon to contribute and 
can easily access 
leadership to share 
ideas. Diversity is a core 
tennent of the 
organization and 
leadership regularly 
engage in the topic of 
diversity. 
Foster an 
achievement-driven 
environment that 
focuses on foresight 
strategy literacy and 
provides overt 
futures-thinking 
learning opportunities 
No resources provided 
for building foresight 
literacy or broadening 
knowledge that could 
contribute to futures 
thinking. 
Some resources for 
professional develop-
ment available, but  
strategic foresight 
opportunities are not 
specifically encouraged. 
Members can seek out 
foresight literacy 
opportunities and 
leadership supports 
learning. Resources are 
not usually provided. 
Organization 
encourages and 
provides resources for 
strategic foresight 
learning opportunities. 
Organization celebrates 
and rewards 
futures-thinking. 
Members are 
incentivized to 
participate in activities 
that broaden foresight 
capabilities and 
knowledge base. 
Members are 
recognized for 
increasing foresight 
literacy. 
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Establishing the boundaries and scope of the endeavor
FRAMING
Identify the root 
questions and true 
issues driving the 
project request, 
reconciling with those 
that have been 
explicitly stated.
Project work is taken at 
face value and 
addresses the stated 
request.
Discussion on 
requirements and 
issues takes place with 
project sponsors to 
clarify and further 
communicate project 
goals.
Prior to a the start of a 
project, detailed 
requirements and 
fundamental 
assumptions are 
documented, reviewed, 
and agreed upon by all 
parties.
A systematic process is 
in place prior to 
initiating work to 
understand, validate, 
and document the 
underlying base 
objectives, goals, and 
assumptions of the 
project.
A process is in place to 
eﬃciently highlight base 
issues and require-
ments, yielding a 
project that achieves 
goals which the 
sponsors did not 
initially know how to 
articulate but now 
recognize as addressing 
their real questions.
Set measurable and 
documented 
objectives which have 
the agreement of 
stakeholders.
Track progress toward 
the objectives and 
reframe root problems 
and issues against 
progress and changes 
external to the 
endeavor.
Goals of the project are 
basically to complete 
the work and to satisfy 
customer requests.
Basic goals and 
objectives are not 
significantly changed 
from their inception 
regardless of external or 
internal changes.
Project sponsors 
discuss their priorities 
and expectations for 
project completion.
Progress is sporadically 
monitored to see if it is 
on course. If major 
events occur or core 
issues are found to be 
wrong, adjustments are 
made.
Participants agree to 
and document a set of 
defined and prioritized 
goals and objectives for 
the project.
Periodic reviews of 
progress are consistent-
ly held. There is a 
change process in place 
to adjust plans and 
reframe goals based on 
new information.
A well-established 
process is in place, 
using best practices to 
create and build 
consensus for 
meaningful and 
objective outcomes.
Insightful organizational 
processes ensure that 
the project is flexible 
and on target to 
address any course 
corrections and meet 
real end-date needs of 
sponsors.
The organization is 
well-known for its 
ability to arrive at 
insightful measure-
ments that clearly 
illuminate and calibrate 
prioritized outcomes.
Plans are seamlessly 
attuned to changes, 
dynamically adjusting 
to provide resources for 
eﬃcient and timely 
proactive responses.
Cultivate healthy 
debate around 
problem frame;  
establish mental 
models that welcome 
divergent 
perspectives, 
question 
assumptions, and 
challenge bias.
Problem space is 
arbitrary and there is 
little discussion around 
problem frame. 
Problem frame is basic 
and fairly obvious. Area 
of inquiry is mandated 
by leadership with little 
input from other 
members. 
Problem framing is 
disciplined and 
collaborative, and 
members are welcome 
to provide feedback to 
foresight inquiry areas. 
Members are rewarded 
for providing feedback 
around problem frame 
and divergent thinking 
is encouraged. 
Members regularly ask if 
they are asking the right 
questions and 
challenging bias.
Strong system of checks 
and balances for 
challenging bias and 
framing foresight 
inquiry. Organization 
consults with external 
network that provides 
feedback and all 
members are rewarded 
for challenging 
dominant mindsets.  
LEVEL 1
Ad-Hoc
LEVEL 2
Aware
LEVEL 3
Capable
LEVEL 4
Competent
LEVEL 5
World-Class
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Ensuring that the plans, people, skills, and processes support the organizational vision
PLANNING
Identify the implica-
tions and 
consequences of 
alternative futures 
and actions.
Explore a variety of 
potential strategies 
and options
Choose and refine a 
strategy that 
optimizes progress 
toward the organiza-
tional vision.
Develop a plan to 
address the activities, 
processes, talent, and 
communications 
required to achieve 
the strategy.
Alternative futures are 
rarely considered—the 
expectation is that the 
future will be a 
continuation of today.
The organization has a 
de facto strategy that 
may be inferred from 
the actions and 
investments that it 
makes.  
The organization 
expects that the normal 
course of events and 
smart daily operational 
decisions will achieve 
their vision.
There are no formal 
project plans. Actions 
and decisions are made 
as needed and 
communication 
generally occurs when 
someone thinks to do 
so.
Alternative futures are 
occasionally 
considered, and these 
generally follow major 
trends identified and 
highlighted by the 
media.
A variety of strategies 
are considered quickly 
without any real 
exploration of their 
implications.
On a periodic basis, 
such as yearly, the 
organization reviews 
and adjusts its strategy 
to make sure it is on 
plan to meet the stated 
vision.
High-level planning 
matches skills and 
needs with periodic 
assessment of missing 
skills. Communication 
can occur frequently 
but generally does so in 
an unstructured format.
Organization regularly 
looks at diﬀerent 
possible futures and 
uses the documented 
implications and 
consequences of these 
exercises to determine 
their plans.
The organization has a 
best-practice process 
for evaluating potential 
strategies and uses 
clear criteria for 
deciding which strategy 
best meets its needs.
There is a process in 
place to continually 
review and evaluate 
trendy or novel 
occurrences happening 
in the fringes of society.
Formal plans and 
processes are in place 
for most or all areas of 
the organization to 
eﬃciently engage and 
manage employees, 
including 
communication 
structure.
Organization has 
processes in place to 
review environmental 
indicators and develop 
a range of possible 
futures. For each of 
these, a thoughtful and 
thorough analysis is 
developed.
A systematic process is 
used to routinely 
re-evaluate strategies 
as new information and 
feedback are available. 
Strategy is often tested 
before implementation.
Strategic alternatives 
are frequently evaluated 
via well-maintained 
quantitative models. 
Adjustments are made 
which optimize 
strategic decisions.
Organizational 
structures and 
procedures have been 
redefined to eliminate 
bureaucracy and 
ineﬃciency. Detailed 
plans and processes are 
an inherent part of 
every employee’s 
vocabulary. 
Organization has 
developed its own 
process and framework 
for eﬃciently and 
accurately reviewing 
downstream 
implications of a wide 
range of possible 
futures.
Members of the 
organization are 
recognized by their 
industry peers for their 
continual creative and  
breakthrough 
strategies.
Strategic decisions are 
continuously refined 
based on real time data 
captured in a highly 
integrated intelligence 
system.
Innovative new 
structures and policies 
have been created that 
engage the ability of the  
“learning”  organization  
to grow and adapt as it 
smoothly executes  well 
thought-out plans.
LEVEL 1
Ad-Hoc
LEVEL 2
Aware
LEVEL 3
Capable
LEVEL 4
Competent
LEVEL 5
World-Class
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Collection of appropriate and relevant information in a format and timeframe that support useful retrieval.
SCANNING
Map the domain of the 
system into a 
framework of areas to 
explore
Collect pertinent 
information from a 
range of diﬀuse and 
credible sources
Identify outliers or 
“outside-the-system” 
signals of impending 
changes that could 
impact the system
Integrate external and 
internal information 
into a common 
framework and 
language
Create a useful and 
accessible 
information repository
The domain map is 
created from those 
areas directly and 
explicitly connected to 
the area of interest.
Information is gathered 
from easily accessible 
resources commonly 
used by the project, and 
collected only as 
needed. 
The media are the 
primary source 
for any signals of 
change.
Scanned information 
points are taken as is, 
with minimal eﬀort 
to understand and 
integrate them.
Scanned data is stored 
in an unstructured and 
ad hoc manner. 
Retrieval is generally by 
the person who 
collected 
the information.
In addition to the 
directly connected 
areas, the domain map 
is augmented with 
other areas 
“called-out" by the 
information collected.
Information is collected 
from traditional 
resources as well as 
some novel sources. 
Eﬀort is made, when 
time allows, to do 
general scanning.
High-impact and 
low-probability events 
are considered in 
addition to media 
spotlights when looking 
for potential surprises.
Linkages are informally 
made and generally 
within a category, 
providing a variable 
view of information.
An informal process is 
in place to collect, tag, 
and store information. 
Information can be 
retrieved but may take 
some time.
A recognized framework 
(such as STEEP) is used 
to create a complete 
domain map, 
supporting evaluation 
of many diﬀerent facets 
of the system.
Information is collected 
routinely from varied 
sources ranging from 
the traditional to 
alternative. Analysts 
consider information 
from other domains 
that could provide 
insight.
There is a process in 
place to continually 
review and evaluate 
trendy or novel 
occurrences happening 
in the fringes of society.
Connections are made 
between diﬀerent 
categories providing a 
comprehensive and 
cohesive view of 
scanned information.
Information is tagged 
and stored in an 
organization-wide 
repository providing 
easy access to retrieve 
information of interest.
Organizational 
processes exist to 
define and build a 
comprehensive domain 
map, exploring domains 
such as second-order 
impacts.
 A systematic process 
collects information 
from a wide range¬ of 
resources and media 
formats on a consistent 
cycle providing for a 
comprehensive view of 
the topic.
Best practices such 
as ethnographic 
journeys or wild cards, 
are part of the 
organization’s culture to 
consistently 
identify outliers.
Universal models 
provide a powerful 
world-view framework 
for deep understanding 
and  an integrated 
picture of the 
information collected.
A high-tech repository 
with an intuitive 
structure helps 
facilitate insight and 
organize thoughts as 
information is retrieved.
An anticipatory domain 
map adjusts dynamical-
ly to changes to provide 
insightful observations 
from underlying 
streams.
Sophisticated 
methodology and tools 
provide timely and 
continuous collection of 
information, allowing 
for visibility on many 
dimensions with unique 
views of the topic.
The organization has 
created unique 
practices in the industry 
to highlight potential 
changes including those 
not related directly to 
the topic.
New, innovative, and 
dynamic models 
created by the 
organization bring 
context and insight to 
diﬀuse and wide-rang-
ing data points.
Organization provides 
leadership in 
state-of-the-art content 
storage and retrieval, 
pushing out information 
in anticipation of need.
LEVEL 1
Ad-Hoc
LEVEL 2
Aware
LEVEL 3
Capable
LEVEL 4
Competent
LEVEL 5
World-Class
Establish broad set of 
external contacts, 
both formal and 
informal, to build 
network of futures 
thinkers. 
No formal or informal 
external contacts - 
organization is isolated.
Some employees have 
formal and informal 
external contacts
Formal contacts are 
encouraged and in 
addition, informal 
contacts are maintained 
by some employees
Formal and informal 
external contacs are 
encouraged. 
Building and maintain-
ing a network of 
external partners is 
encouraged and 
perceived as important 
for every employee.
Only leadership are 
aware of and engaged in 
scanning, in a very 
narrow area of inquiry.
Some members are 
aware of foresight 
engagements. No clear 
way of contributing. 
All members are aware 
of foresight engage-
ments and encouraged 
to contribute thinking. 
All members are 
incentivized to 
participate in foresight 
engagements. 
All members are 
incentivized to build 
internal contacts and 
engage those contacts 
in futures thinking. All 
members have futures 
thinking as part of their 
individual mandates. 
Inclusive and broad 
data collection. 
Gather diverse  
perspectives from 
across the 
organization 					
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Acquire insight into 
emerging ideas or 
themes with the 
aggregation of 
information into 
categorized clusters.
Consider the widest 
possible set of 
plausible alternative 
futures in evaluating 
choices or decisions 
aﬀecting the system.
Distill and detail 
plausible alternative 
futures into the 
working set for 
consideration.
Information is organized 
based on identifiable 
surface information.
Alternative futures are 
generally in the comfort 
zone of the probable, 
and are variations on 
the expected future for 
the domain of interest.
Alternative forecasts are 
primarily used "as is" 
from the information 
collected.
Information is collected 
and organized in a 
manner which supports 
the generation of ideas 
of interest.
Alternative futures are 
established from the 
domain of interest and 
directly related areas 
and provide for a range 
of possibilities.
Alternative forecasts are 
reviewed and a subset 
is selected.  Additional 
information is 
documented to support 
the selected alterna-
tives and present a 
more understandable 
view.
Information is organized 
such that useful ideas 
and themes clearly 
emerge.
Plausible alternative 
futures are drawn from 
analysis of all 
contextual categories to 
understand broader 
possibilities for the 
domain of interest.
A manageable set of 
alternative futures 
covering the full range 
of topics is produced. 
Each alternative 
contains significant  
detail, supporting the 
key implications.
Organizational 
processes for 
aggregating information 
are based on 
established models, 
providing additional 
perspective and 
comprehensive framing 
for themes and ideas. 
Exploration of most of 
the plausible options is 
an integral part of 
developing alternative 
futures and provides 
complete coverage of 
the domain of interest.
A systematic process is 
in place to produce a 
set of alternative 
futures. Each alternative 
is presented in a clear 
and comprehensive way
The organization is 
recognized for creating 
a framework which sets 
the standard for 
illuminating underlying 
discoveries in the 
information collected.
The set of alternative 
futures covers the 
highly probable to the 
extremes of what’s 
plausible, providing  
comprehensive 
coverage of the system.
An optimal set of 
alternative futures is 
generated. Each 
alternative makes 
critical elements 
immediately apparent 
and the accompanying 
depth provides 
unchallengeable 
support.
LEVEL 1
Ad-Hoc
LEVEL 2
Aware
LEVEL 3
Capable
LEVEL 4
Competent
LEVEL 5
World-Class
Collection of appropriate and relevant information in a format and timeframe that support useful retrieval.
FORECASTING
Validate foresight to 
create an integrated 
set of credible and 
coherent alternative 
futures.
The set of distilled and 
detailed alternative 
futures is used "as is."
Follow-up research is 
done on a fact-checking 
basis.
Alternative futures are 
checked and revised so 
that they tell a coherent 
story. 
Preliminary implications 
are identified to test the 
alternative futures for 
relevance.
The set of alternative 
futures is reviewed and 
revised to ensure that a 
balanced set of 
view-points and 
perspectives is 
represented. 			
			
	
	
164 
Creation of a preferred future that imaginatively captures values and ideals
VISIONING / REALIZING
Elicit and incorporate 
goals, values, and 
aspirations of 
members and 
stakeholders.
Bring to the surface 
the underlying 
assumptions, 
espoused beliefs and 
values, and operation-
al artifacts which 
establish the culture. 
The leader sets their 
values and vision for the 
organization, and then 
communicates it to the 
organization.
Members of the 
organization assume 
that that are the norm 
or that they follow the 
norm. and that their 
culture and the way  it 
works are both obvious 
and consistent with 
what is generally 
portrayed by the media.
The leader establishes 
the vision and then 
promotes it within the 
organization, 
highlighting its benefit 
and rationale.
The organization 
recognizes some of the 
limitations of its culture 
("that won’t work here") 
but hasn’t articulated 
how the culture works 
and how to leverage it.
Consulting with close 
advisors and senior 
leadership, the leader 
creates the vision that 
best represents their 
collective values and 
ideas.
The obvious aspects of 
the culture of the 
organization are known 
and are challenged as 
appropriate to move the 
organization forward.
The leader engages the 
majority of stakeholders 
using a facilitated 
process to develop a 
robust vision.
Members of the 
organization have 
evaluated their culture, 
providing a solid 
understanding of both 
the obvious and subtle, 
enabling challenge and 
change for some of the 
underlying but more  
impactful areas.
Vision and values are 
co-created with the full 
participation and 
energy of stakeholders.
A keen grasp of their 
culture enables 
members of the 
organization to create 
new ways to leverage 
themselves by 
purposely challenging 
current cultural modes 
of operation.
Articulate the unique 
contribution that 
frames the organiza-
tion’s view moving 
forward.
Craft the vision in a 
manner that is both 
inspirational and 
motivational, 
resonating with the 
hearts and minds of 
those who will follow 
it.
Members of the 
organization assume 
that providing industry 
standard oﬀerings that 
are better some way 
(e.g., cheaper, faster)  
makes them unique.
The vision statement 
exists but is known to 
only a few people inside 
the organization and 
none outside the 
organization.
The organization 
includes its internal 
strength (people or 
process) to help define 
its value to the industry.
The vision statement is 
communicated across 
the organization and is 
used in selected 
exercises and venues.
The organization clearly 
articulates its value 
proposition by 
identifying and defining 
the unique contribution 
it is able to make.
The vision statement, 
known by most 
members of the 
organization, resonates 
with employees and 
customers alike and is 
identifiable with the 
organization.
The value proposition 
the organization has 
framed makes it unique 
among industry peers 
and easily identifiable 
by all industry clients.
The organization’s vision 
is used to craft all 
external and internal 
communication, 
keeping the vision 
visible, current, and 
providing energy for 
organizational activity
The organization’s value 
statement and identity 
become a synonym and 
standard for the 
industry.
Members of the 
organization are 
inspired and enabled to 
make decisions and 
take action to bring the 
vision to life providing a 
framework for all 
internal and external 
encounters.
LEVEL 1
Ad-Hoc
LEVEL 2
Aware
LEVEL 3
Capable
LEVEL 4
Competent
LEVEL 5
World-Class
Clearly articulate 
strategic foresight 
mandate. Display 
outcomes of foresight 
engagement and 
ensure they are 
accessible to all. 
Members are unclear on 
the purpose of foresight 
engagement. No 
articulated vision of 
desired outcomes. 
Some members are 
engaged with strategic 
foresight. Outcomes are 
superficial, and often 
have little impact on 
strategic initiatives. 
Members are engaged 
with strategic foresight 
and purpose is clear. 
Outcomes generated 
are published and 
available for members 
to engage with.
Members are aligned on 
the purpose and value 
of strategic foresight 
engagement. Outcomes 
are clearly articulated 
and communicated 
throughout organization 
and inform strategic 
initiatives.
Preferred future is 
clearly articulated and 
is the organization’s top 
priority. It is known to 
all members at the 
organization and are at 
the core of all strategic 
activities. Outcomes of 
foresight projects are 
shared externally and 
embody the organiza-
tion’s identity. 			
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How an organization's ideas are communicated, and how the appropriate actions are triggered.
CLIMATE & COMMUNICATION
Build strong 
mechanisms to share 
futures thinking 
across all functions of 
the organization. 
Poor: information is 
ignored and hoarded.
Exchange of information 
is rare and happens 
only in predefined 
formal channels. 
Exchange of information 
occurs on various levels 
but mostly in formalized 
channels. 
Excellent: ongoing 
information sharing on 
many levels.
Other organizations 
learn best practices 
from them in how to 
share information (are 
invited to speak on the 
topic, have published 
material that is oft 
cited, etc)
Encourage strong 
Informal 
communication of 
futures thinking, 
integrating foresight 
into ‘water cooler’ 
conversation 
Poor: no informal 
communication.
Limited informal 
information across 
functions. 
Informal 
communication is 
encouraged, part of 
casual conversation.  
Future insights are 
diﬀused eﬀectively and 
often reach the relevant 
decision-makers 
through informal 
communication.  
Members regularly refer 
to the preferred vision 
of the future
Informal communica-
tion is a core value and 
organization has a 
system to evaluates its 
communication 
regularly. Members 
regularly refer to the 
preferred vision of the 
future with external 
stakeholders. 
LEVEL 1
Ad-Hoc
LEVEL 2
Aware
LEVEL 3
Capable
LEVEL 4
Competent
LEVEL 5
World-Class
Clearly comunicate 
the goals, results, and 
implications of 
foresight activities
There are implicit and 
often undocumented 
goals and plans from 
foresight activities. The 
senior leaders may or 
may not be aware of the 
general direction and 
implications of this 
eﬀort.
Goals and results from 
foresight activity are 
usually documented 
but are primarily 
communicated to 
managers and key 
people in the 
organization.
Goals and plans from 
foresight activity are 
conveyed to the 
organization. Everyone 
is aware of the 
implications and aligns 
work and responsibili-
ties appropriately.
Everyone in the 
organization considers 
and uses the goals and 
plans from foresight 
work to inform their 
decisions and perform 
their daily activity
In addition to informing 
day-to-day decisions 
with implications from 
foresight activity, all 
organizational members 
become part of the 
immediate feedback 
loop that refines and 
adjusts the goals and 
results 			
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Build habitual, 
consistent practice of 
scanning the 
periphery
Limited and myopic: 
few people care. 
Some people are 
looking into the 
periphery, but they are 
not known and called 
upon.
Some people are 
looking into the 
periphery, they are 
known but not called 
upon. 
Active and curious: 
scanning the periphery 
is commonplace. 
Robust, consistent 
scanning. Organization 
has set the bar for 
others and share their 
best practices. 
Stimulating and sustaining the conditions for consideration of the long view
CULTURE
LEVEL 1
Ad-Hoc
LEVEL 2
Aware
LEVEL 3
Capable
LEVEL 4
Competent
LEVEL 5
World-Class
Cultivate testing 
environment for 
inquiry; welcome 
divergent 
perspectives, 
question 
assumptions, and 
challenge bias.
Foresight inquiry is not 
thoughtful. There is 
little discussion about 
why organization is 
engaging in futures 
thinking. 
Foresight inquiry is 
basic and fairly obvious. 
Problem space is 
mandated by leadership 
with little input from 
other members. 
Problem framing is 
disciplined and 
collaborative, and 
members are welcome 
to provide feedback to 
foresight inquiry areas. 
There is som knowledge 
of basic assumptions.
Members are rewarded 
for providing feedback 
and divergent thinking 
is encouraged. Basic 
assumptions are 
explicit, much talked 
about, and frequently 
challenged. 
Strong system of checks 
and balances for 
challenging bias and 
framing foresight 
inquiry. External 
network that provides 
feedback and all 
members are rewarded 
for challenging 
dominant mindsets.  
Create an environ-
ment and processes 
that drive foresight 
knowledge into 
action. 
The organization 
responds in an ad hoc 
manner to any foresight 
knowledge. Activities 
are undertaken without 
a clear sense of how it 
will be acted upon.
There is an informal 
process to include 
foresight information in 
formal plans. 
Organizational leaders 
may or may not be  
aware of it. If the 
situation allows, they 
try to include it.
Formal processes exist 
to make sure that 
knowledge gained 
during foresight 
activities is moved into 
the strategic and 
operational activities of 
the organization.
Systematic processes 
exist to drive foresight 
knowledge and 
implications into all 
existing organizational 
processes in a  timely 
and non-disruptive 
manner.
Foresight knowledge is 
a basic pillar for all 
organizational activity. 
There is a tight 
feedback loop that 
provides additional 
insight from operational 
results back through to 
the foresight process.
Recognize the cultural 
artifacts and mental 
models operating in 
the organization and 
how they influence 
organizational 
decisions.
Members of the 
organization are not 
specifically aware of 
their culture and its 
impact on their 
operational processes.
There is recognition of 
the cultural diﬀerences 
and heritage of the 
organization. It uses this 
information to 
implement major policy 
changes.
Members of the 
organization have 
considerable 
understanding of how 
their culture works and 
use this knowledge 
explicitly in building 
eﬀective strategic and 
operational plans and 
policies.
Members of the 
organization have a 
thorough understanding 
of their culture and 
have done a compre-
hensive analysis of how 
this interacts with 
strategic and 
operational aspects of 
the business.
The deep understand-
ing of cultural elements 
creates a dynamic 
ethos that crafts new 
traditions and stories to 
continually evolve with 
change.
When approaching 
uncertainty, 
organization refers to 
tried-and-true 
strategies that have 
worked in the past. 
Organization looks to 
other strategies in the 
existing landscape to 
reduce uncertainty 
about the future. 
When faced with 
uncertainty, 
organization considers 
foresight as a tool for 
planning and strategy.
Members are 
encouraged to use 
futures thinking as a 
mental model in times 
of uncertainty. Foresight 
is a strong component 
organizational thinking.
Organization uses 
foresight as a way of 
thinking to reduce 
uncertainty and 
challenge bias. Strong 
sense of checks and 
balances in place to 
challenge bias that 
engages external 
stakeholders as well as 
internal ones. 
Use foresight as a 
heuristic to reduce 
uncertainty about the 
future. 
Committment to 
Kaizen; incremental, 
continous improve-
ment of future-facing 
organizational culture
Culture is scarcely 
referenced, or referred 
to in passing. There is 
little talk of a future 
vision on a day-to-day 
basis. 
Culture is identified as a 
problem. The desire to 
be more future-facing is 
there, but not a priority 
for leadership. 
Members are not 
actively encouraged to 
spark change.  
Organization considers 
its culture periodically. 
Leadership engages 
members in dialogue 
about creating more 
future-facing cultural 
conditions. Small 
changes are made, 
sporadically. 
Disciplined eﬀort to 
foster more future-fac-
ing culture. Members 
are encouraged to work 
on culture on an 
individual basis, and 
there is an ongoing 
conversation about 
culture. 
Organization makes 
healthy, visible 
decisions to improve its 
culture every day. All 
members are 
encouraged and 
incentivized to be more 
future-facing and foster 
a more rewarding 
culture. 
			
